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The Political Economy of the Opioid Epidemic 
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar* & Keith Humphreys** 
Public health problems have a political economy rooted largely in public 
and private laws that both reflect the distribution of power in society and 
shape its policy responses. In this Article, we apply this perspective to the U.S. 
opioid crisis, which was triggered by a quadrupling of opioid prescribing 
beginning in the mid-1990s. Such staggering increases in opioid use are 
impossible to understand without unpacking the incentives and institutional 
pressures associated with the distribution and use of addictive legal drugs, 
particularly how those pressures can dilute the substantive goals and 
efficacy of regulatory governance. The policy response to the explosion of 
opioid use, addiction, and overdose contrasts sharply with the swift and 
punitive response to illicit drug markets in the 1980s and early 1990s, which 
involved harsh sentences, increased policing, and stricter border controls. 
Subsequently, as Americans increased their unlawful use of legally available 
drugs—products nominally subject to controls but often distributed in large 
quantities by actors with major incentives to encourage their use—
pharmaceutical companies encountered, for the most part, a combination of 
legislatively created regulatory loopholes as well as patterns of lax state and 
federal enforcement. Doctors also encountered regulatory loopholes and lax 
enforcement, despite some efforts to develop databases in order to track 
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prescriptions. Pain clinics and prescription “pill mills” proliferated. For drug 
companies, the ability to market addictive drugs by leveraging close 
relationships with doctors was facilitated by a variety of legal strategies that 
allowed for willful blindness on the part of physicians, which limited their 
risk of regulatory and criminal liability. The contrast relative to the 
enforcement strategies associated with use of traditional illicit drugs has 
been described as stemming in part from the presence of many white, 
middle-class users and the relatively minor amount of violence and crime 
compared to the cocaine and methamphetamine epidemics. We add to that 
the influence of a large industry with a prominent role in the legal 
economy—an industry that encountered diluted regulatory governance over 
a product that has numerous legal and beneficial uses as well as the 
potential to be extremely destructive. Tort law still casts a shadow over some 
aspects of the opioid epidemic, but its reach and consequences in this context 
depend at least as much on the constraints affecting tort litigation and 
access to courts (including limits on class actions and remedies) as on the 
content of tort law doctrine. 
Over time, jurisdictions came to pursue civil remedies, prosecutors 
expanded the use of criminal sanctions, and policymakers began supporting 
stricter constraints on opioid production, distribution, and prescription. Yet 
these responses have been slow in coming and continue to face practical and 
political barriers. Although these observations do not yield a straightforward 
solution, they illuminate how institutional realities as well as political and 
economic pressures operate against the backdrop of various legal domains 
that can enable or exacerbate a public health crisis. Without taking those 
realities seriously, narrow interventions focused on a single area of law or 
isolated technical changes in treatment may prove largely ineffective. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the start of this century, more Americans died from drug 
overdose than in World Wars I and II combined.1 Although the full extent 
 
1. Keith Humphreys et al., Opioids of the Masses: Stopping an American Epidemic 
From Going Global, FOREIGN AFF. (May/June 2018), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-04-16/opioids-
of the opioid crisis may have been exacerbated by a range of economic, 
social, and health factors, there is little doubt about what triggered it: a 
four-fold increase in opioid prescribing that began in the 1990s.2 The U.S. 
opioid crisis—the deadliest epidemic in the past 60 years, including 
HIV/AIDS—has been the subject of extensive public and policy discussion. 
Yet a mystery concerning the current problem remains to be explained. 
Unregulated opioid drugs have existed throughout U.S. history and 
have been the cause of multiple epidemics of addiction and overdose, 
including “patent medicines” (e.g., laudanum) in the late 1800s and heroin 
in the 1970s.3 Yet the worst opioid epidemic is occurring right now and 
was started by legally chartered companies, marketing products approved 
by the federal government and distributed by the putatively well-
regulated medical profession. Hence the mystery: with an unprecedented 
level of governmental control over an opioid drug—at least on paper—
how did the current epidemic become substantially worse than prior ones 
where essentially no regulatory powers were in place? 
To resolve this puzzle, we must understand a critical aspect of the 
context for the opioid crisis: how legal and political institutions shape 
public health problems. Public health phenomena, such as epidemics of 
drug addiction, have a political economy rooted largely in public and 
private law and in the constellation of interests that seek to shape the 
content and application of law.4 While these dynamics are likely to affect 
 
masses [https://perma.cc/3HQS-BPPF]; see also Overdose Death Rates, NAT’L 
INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (Jan. 2019), https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-
topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates [https://perma.cc/77AL-
DXXL]. 
2. See Nat’l Ctr. for Injury Prevention & Control, Prescription Painkiller 
Overdoses in the US, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov. 2011), 
https://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/painkilleroverdoses/index.html.  
[https://perma.cc/34WL-YFTV]. 
3. See generally DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE: A HISTORY OF OPIATE 
ADDICTION IN AMERICA (2001). 
4. For another analysis of public health phenomena focused on interests and 
institutions, see, for example, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Modeling Partial 
Agency Autonomy in Public-Health Policymaking, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
471 (2014). Although this perspective is not entirely unique, many analyses 
of public health phenomena often play up the scientific and technical 
challenges without devoting sufficient attention to how political and 
institutional factors affect the legal context and, in turn, help explain why 
particular public health problems arise or persist in some circumstances and 
not in others. 
most systematic, national efforts to improve public health––from reducing 
risks of foodborne illness to improving air quality—they are particularly 
acute in the case of legal-drug epidemics. When legal products are at issue, 
regulators must find ways to balance the positive, legal uses of such drugs 
(e.g., for pain relief) and their destructive effects, a process that in 
principal—if not necessarily in practice—ought to bring to the table not 
only drug manufacturers and distributors but also health care funders and 
insurers, patients, doctors, and the larger public. Further, drug addiction 
impairs human capacities that normally help constrain the development of 
public health problems. All humans are inherently shaped by a variety of 
biological and psychological realities that often raise legal and policy 
challenges, such as the willingness to pursue short-term rewards at long-
term cost, self-interested behavior in the face of collective costs, and 
cognitive limitations in risk appraisal. Humans who are addicted to drugs 
are even more vulnerable to these tendencies.5 
The extent to which these realities generate public health challenges is 
inherently affected by the legal and regulatory environment and by the 
political and economic forces that affect human behavior through their 
impact on the legal system. In such a world, we can reliably expect major 
public health consequences to arise from the substance and 
implementation of laws relating to criminal enforcement and investigation 
(e.g., affecting law enforcement responses, substantive offenses, and 
monitoring), regulation, and compensation for injury. Despite the extent of 
the opioid crisis and its long gestation, serious limitations arising from 
pluralist politics, organizational challenges and institutional 
fragmentation, and longstanding substantive and procedural 
characteristics have diluted the relevance and efficacy of legal and 
regulatory constraints, such as more robust monitoring of pill distribution, 
that could have mitigated the crisis. By understanding those constraints, 
we can appreciate both the consequences of diluted legal adaptation in 
public health and other regulatory domains and how society can overcome 
these dynamics in certain contexts. 
In this particular context, staggering increases in opioid use are 
impossible to understand without unpacking the incentives and 
institutional pressures associated with the distribution and use of 
nominally legal drugs. Today the United States makes up approximately 
4.4% of the world’s population but consumes one-third of the world’s 
 
5. See generally Keith Humphreys et al., Brains, Environments and Policy 
Responses to Addiction, 356 SCIENCE 1237 (2017). 
opioid supply.6 And as population exposure rises, so does the rate of 
addiction. 
While law enforcement was focused on illegal drugs such as 
methamphetamine in the 1990s, legal drugs manufactured by the 
pharmaceutical industry began to be prescribed and used more regularly. 
The most famous of these was Oxycontin, a long-acting opioid marketed by 
Purdue Pharma.7 A combination of aggressive marketing by 
pharmaceutical companies and unfettered prescribing by trusted health 
care providers led to surging opioid use, addiction, and overdose over the 
next fifteen years. These facilitators of demand were further enhanced by 
the demand-generating effects of addiction itself: as people become 
physically tolerant to drugs, they need more to sustain the same effects. 
The financial crisis of 2007 to 2008 likely exacerbated these trends both 
by tempting some financially desperate people into dealing diverted 
pharmaceutical opioids and by making emotionally and physically 
suffering people in deprived areas (e.g., Appalachia) more prone to 
addiction. 
Drug companies encountered, for the most part, a combination of 
legislatively created regulatory loopholes as well as patterns of lax state 
and federal enforcement. The same was true for doctors, despite some 
efforts to develop databases tracking prescriptions. “Pain clinics” and 
prescription “drug mills” proliferated. Changing the nature of the drugs in 
question, for example, by creating “tamper-resistant” formulations to 
reduce the risk of misuse, was costly and sometimes backfired.  
For drug companies, the incentives to market drugs widely by 
leveraging close relationships with doctors played out against a backdrop 
where a variety of legal strategies were available to achieve forms of 
willful blindness, limiting risks of regulatory and criminal liability. The 
contrast with the enforcement strategies associated with spiking drug use 
in the 1980s and 1990s is remarkable—reflecting, among other things, 
already strained capacity within prisons, lower levels of violence 
associated with opioid provision and use, and the influence of a large 
industry with a prominent role in the legal economy. The significant 
representation of white, middle-class people among those addicted to 
pharmaceutical opioids also likely led to a softening of police responses, 
 
6. See Gary Garrison, Claire McCaskill Cites Disproven Figure on Opioid Use, 
POLITIFACT: MO. (May 10, 2017, 10:32 AM), https://www.politifact.com/
missouri/statements/2017/may/10/claire-mccaskill/mccaskill-cites-long-
disproven-figure-opioid-use/ [https://perma.cc/Y5TD-B5X4]. 
7. See infra Section III.F. 
relative to the epidemics of crack cocaine (which was concentrated among 
low-income African Americans) and methamphetamine (which was 
concentrated among low-income, rural whites). 
The political economy of the crisis also implicated civil society. 
Backlash against the brutality of the response to crack cocaine eventually 
contributed to the conclusion among many policymakers and opinion 
leaders that drugs could be more effectively handled if the criminal justice 
system backed off and allowed market participants to rely on voluntary 
efforts.8 This created a cultural space for the pharmaceutical industry and 
its allies (witting or unwitting) to delegitimize concern about the sharp 
rise of prescribing opioids as stemming from a “drug war mentality.” In 
some cases, legal entities and leaders in the industry were also able to 
enhance their reputation and influence through donations to universities, 
museums, civic organizations, and political causes. These trends likely 
contributed to a government response starkly different from those 
involving drugs distributed through illicit markets. 
In Part II of this Article, we provide some of the crucial public health 
context for understanding the social policy challenges and legal dilemmas 
associated with opioid use, misuse, and addiction. We start with a 
description of some of the properties and characteristics of opioids. We do 
this in order to emphasize why challenges associated with diluted 
regulatory governance are especially pronounced when society 
encounters particularly difficult implementation problems in the 
regulation of substances that are highly addictive or rife with possibilities 
for misuse, yet also have a useful role and are therefore made legally 
available. Because both the economic benefits derived from selling opioids 
and many legal strategies to mitigate misuse depend on the process of 
drug distribution, we begin by explaining how an opioid dose gets to a user 
and how licit and illicit opioid use has changed in the United States in the 
last few decades. 
Given that opioid-related public health problems are driven to a 
considerable extent by misuse of products that are legal for some 
individuals to use under certain conditions, Part III turns to the mechanics 
of how American society regulates the availability of those opioid-based 
products that have contingent lawful health uses. The relevant legal tools 
here include not only conventional regulatory rules directly governing the 
manufacture or distribution of opioids, but also tort and criminal law, 
which play a quasi-regulatory function mediated by legal doctrine and the 
market for litigation in the civil context. Whether or not agencies 
 
8. See infra Section III.C. 
implement regulatory rules explicitly focused on opioids or 
pharmaceutical products more generally, in principle drug company 
officials, distributors, and doctors should care about the risk that their 
actions may land them in prison or lead to a costly tort suit. Jurisdictions’ 
civil and criminal strategies, along with other policies affecting the market 
for litigation, in turn can strengthen or weaken the power of these 
deterrents. 
Although our primary focus here is on how the lawful market for 
opioids is regulated, the picture of disaggregated responsibilities 
sprawling across a variety of state and federal organizations also tells a 
larger story about the challenges of regulating “dual-use” products, those 
products that can be lawful or unlawful depending on the circumstances. 
As we discuss generally and with specific examples involving a major 
pharmaceutical company and drug distributors, criminal and civil actions 
have become an important part of the response. Yet because of limitations 
in the infrastructure to gathering information about opioid use (in some 
cases as a result of opposition to legislative and regulatory measures) as 
well as understandable constraints built into the relevant law, responses 
have been slow in coming and have had, up to now, mixed results. Tort law 
still casts a shadow over some aspects of the opioid epidemic, but its reach 
and consequences in this context depend at least as much on the 
constraints affecting tort litigation, access to courts (including limits on 
class actions, and remedies), and the decisions of jurisdictions to pursue 
such remedies over time as on the content of tort law doctrine.9 
Part IV then connects insights about the political economy of public 
health regulation—including the role of organizational rigidity, risk 
aversion, and lack of capacity—to the problems of opioid misuse and 
addiction. We explain why the mix of forces affecting the legal context 
governing opioid-related issues results in a kind of “diluted regulatory 
governance.” We draw examples not only from battles over opioid policy 
but also from the American approach to other addictive products, such as 
cigarettes. We conclude by reflecting on tentative lessons that can be 
drawn from a more nuanced understanding of the political economy of 
public health law. 
More specifically, we contend that these political economy pressures 
affect the realities of implementation shaping legal responses to certain 
public health problems. The result is what we call diluted regulatory 
governance: regulatory responses to govern the public health crisis still 
occur, but they are delayed and constrained in ways that perhaps would, in 
 
9. See infra Section III.E. 
retrospect, surprise the public. Diluted regulatory governance does not 
mean that there is no meaningful regulation. It means that it takes longer, 
sometimes contradicts itself, and often has a milder effect than what one 
would expect given the extent of the harm involved (and how it compares 
to other harms), the level of putative concern among the public, and the 
level of interest from policymakers. Understanding the disconnect 
requires attention to all the forces that fragment power, limit policy 
change, and impede the use of existing legal tools.10 While some degree of 
“dilution” can be expected whenever a pluralist system with imperfect 
implementation confronts public health and related risks, the challenge is 
especially acute in circumstances akin to those that spawned the opioid 
crisis. Yet where the possibilities for addiction or misuse are pronounced, 
the economic stakes are enormous, the possibilities for evading 
responsibility are substantial (because of a lack of accountability within 
organizations), and the means of constraining policy change are available. 
In advancing this analysis, we recognize that prescription opioids have 
legitimate—and in some cases enormous—benefits. Indeed, that is a key 
reason why governance over them is so frequently diluted as opposed to 
governance of drugs that are solely harmful. But if the optimal societal 
response calls for some degree of surveillance and accountability, we want 
to underscore the magnitude of the challenges institutions will tend to face 
in achieving even that measured response. Overcoming these challenges 
requires more than sensible policy analyses, data, legal arguments, and 
some measure of widespread public concern. What is crucial is a mix of 
public concern; a coalition of actors within and outside government to 
mobilize public action; and parties able to seek legal recourse that can 
generate information about key actors, which can further the public’s 
understanding and establish a reliable narrative of the costs to individuals 
and society. 
Although our account does not yield a straightforward solution, it 
illuminates how institutional realities as well as political and economic 
pressures operate against the backdrop of various legal domains that can 
enable or exacerbate a public health crisis. They also highlight the risks of 
 
10. Although we discuss in Part IV a number of legal and policy changes with the 
potential to improve the situation, we do not argue that simple solutions are 
easily available through unified governance in a single agency, facilitation of 
civil litigation, or enhancement of government enforcement powers. Instead 
we argue that, while a variety of the legal and policy changes we discuss may 
better align private incentives with the public interest, the more 
fundamental reality is that political economy shapes the nature of public 
health problems. 
romanticizing the capacity of legal and regulatory arrangements to rein in 
multinational corporations that legally produce addictive products. 
Without taking those realities seriously, narrow interventions focused on a 
single area of law or isolated technical changes in treatment may prove 
mostly beside the point. 
II. PLACING OPIOIDS IN CONTEXT AND UNDERSTANDING HOW AN OPIOID 
DOSE GETS TO A USER 
The fountainhead of all opioids is a flower that human beings have 
cultivated for over five-thousand years: the opium poppy. When cut, the 
seed pod of the plant releases a milky latex that is called raw opium when 
collected and dried. With the rise of modern chemistry in the 18th and 
19th centuries, more potent and pure opioids were refined from raw 
opium and the husk of the poppy seed pod (“poppy straw”), including 
morphine and heroin. In recent decades, other opioids, such as fentanyl, 
have been produced through entirely synthetic means.11 
Opioids of all forms bind to receptors in the brain. This produces 
multiple effects on users, including euphoria (i.e., emotions of joy, well-
being, and relaxation), analgesia (i.e., relief from physical pain), and 
depression of multiple basic biological functions (e.g., slowed breathing, 
sleepiness, constipation, disrupted hormonal regulation).12 The euphoria 
most users experience from taking opioids, as well as the analgesia for the 
subset who are in pain, make taking opioids rewarding for most users. The 
depression of basic biological functions makes them dangerous: breathing 
can slow to the point that the brain and other vital organs are fatally 
deprived of oxygen, and sleepiness can result in serious accidents (for 
example, if a user nods off while driving). 
Repeated opioid use can result in tolerance, dependence, and/or 
addiction. The human brain becomes tolerant to the repeated 
administration of opioids such that the same dose does not continue to 
produce the same effect. In pursuit of the marked euphoria/analgesia 
experienced early on, many users raise their dose, thereby exposing 
themselves to increased risk of harm. Dependent users experience 
withdrawal in the absence of opioids, which is typically characterized by 
flu-like physical symptoms coupled with an inverse of the drug’s effects 
(e.g., emotional misery, sleeplessness). Desire to avoid these symptoms 
 
11. See generally COURTWRIGHT, supra note 3; Humphreys et al., supra note 1. 
12. See Anna Lembke et al., Weighing the Risks and Benefits of Chronic Opioid 
Therapy, 93 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 982 (2016). 
motivates some individuals to keep using opioids. Being dependent is not 
the same as being disabled by an addiction. Some long-term pain patients 
as well as patients in methadone maintenance clinics are dependent on 
opioids but are highly functional in their daily lives, indeed often more so 
than they would be without opioids. Opioids can also produce addiction, 
such that the individual continues to engage in opioid use despite 
destructive consequences. Addiction produces other brain adaptations 
over time including decreased reward from non-drug sources (e.g., food, 
warmth, sex, social interaction) and greater difficulty exerting self-control 
over impulses to use the drug.13 
A. HOW OPIOIDS GET TO USERS 
To understand how these characteristics of this product and the 
people who consume it have affected the United States in recent years, we 
need to understand how opioids—including legally prescribed ones—get 
to users, and how patterns of opioid use have changed over the years. 
Licit prescriptions. The near-quadrupling of opioid prescriptions that 
began in the mid-1990s resulted in the per capita opioid consumption in 
the United States outstripping every other country in the world by a huge 
margin (see Figure 1).14 There is nothing per se illegal about this situation; 
producing and distributing pharmaceutical opioids under license is legal 
under U.S. law as well as international treaties to which the United States 
is a signatory. Subject to Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) quotas, 
manufacturers produce opioids using domestically produced or imported 
raw materials or by synthesizing them directly.15 Drug distribution 
companies operate as middlemen, purchasing large quantities of opioids 
wholesale from manufacturers and then delivering them at a markup to 
local distribution points (e.g., pharmacies). 
 
13. See Nora D. Volkow et al., Neurobiologic Advances from the Brain Disease 
Model of Addiction, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 363 (2016). 
14. Int’l Narcotics Control Board, Narcotic Drugs 2015: Estimated World 




15. See Established Aggregate Production Quotas for Schedule I and II Controlled 
Substances and Assessment of Annual Needs for the List I Chemicals 
Ephedrine, Pseudoephedrine, and Phenylpropanolamine for 2019, 83 Fed. 
Reg. 67, 348 (Dec. 28, 2018). 
Medical professionals who hold a DEA-issued controlled substance 
license are allowed to prescribe opioids for patients. In some limited 
circumstances, the prescriber will possess and administer the opioids 
directly, such as hospital staff using opioids to medicate the pain of an 
inpatient recovering from surgery. But most licit use occurs when patients 
are given a prescription and fill it themselves by submitting it to a licensed 
pharmacy.16 Prescriptions specify the type of opioid, its dose, how often 
the patient is to take it, and whether it is one-time-only or refillable. Under 
the Controlled Substances Act, all opioids are assigned a place on a 
“schedule” that runs from I to V. Opioids that have a medical use are on 
Schedules II-V. Somewhat counterintuitively, drugs scheduled with lower 
numbers are more potent and hence subject to more restrictive rules 
regarding the circumstances under which they can be prescribed and 
refilled.17 
Opioids carry an unusual amount of risk relative to other widely 
prescribed medicines, and many individuals become addicted to them or 
overdose on them even when they have followed their prescription to the 
letter. At the same time, however, the legal availability of pharmaceutical 
opioids through the health care system also prevents enormous human 
suffering, such as in the palliative care of the terminally ill, the treatment 
of cancer, and the conduct of and recovery from most surgeries. 
 
16. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G & MED., PAIN MANAGEMENT AND THE OPIOID 
EPIDEMIC: BALANCING SOCIETAL AND INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS AND RISKS OF PRESCRIPTION 
OPIOID USE 187-267 (Richard J. Bonnie et al. eds., 2017), 
http://nationalacademies.org/hmd/Reports/2017/pain-management-and-
the-opioid-epidemic.aspx [https://perma.cc/XGA9-H6ZN] (describing 
trends in opioid use and misuse). 
17. For some of the factors considered when a drug is scheduled, see The 




More thoroughly illicit channels also provide a steady supply of 
opioids. Criminal organizations produce and sell fake prescription opioids 
just as they do heroin.18 This Article, however, will focus on legally 
manufactured opioids and how these legal substances are illegally 
obtained and used. 
Acts of theft. A small amount of prescription opioids enters the illegal 
market through discrete criminal acts, e.g., a patient filches a doctor’s 
prescription pad, an armed robber steals a pharmacy’s supply of 
Oxycontin, or a gang successfully diverts an opioid shipment from a 
 
18. Press Release, Gulfport Police Dep’t, Public Notice—Oxycodone/Fentanyl 
(May 7, 2018), http://www.gulfportpolice.net/notices/public-notice-
oxycodone-fentanyl [https://perma.cc/3LVA-USJA]; Sumathi Reddy, The 
Uphill Fight Against Fake Prescription Drugs, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2018, 10:35 
AM EST), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-uphill-fight-against-fake-
prescription-drugs-1539009351 [https://perma.cc/3TGW-6D64]. 
wholesaler.19 But these rather dramatic events are a sideshow to the far 
more systemic ways in which prescription opioids are supplied and used 
illegally.20 
Diversion of excess opioids. Most patients do not take all the opioids 
they are prescribed. For just one class of medical procedures—surgery—
this excess of pills is estimated at over three billion per year.21 If all were 
sold on the black market, the revenues from just those pills would well 
exceed the size of the black market for any one of the three major, purely 
illegal drugs (heroin, cocaine/crack, and methamphetamine). The licit 
market thus has the effect of creating an enormous reservoir of pills which 
may be tapped into by addicted individuals, curious teens, and drug 
dealers who engage in theft. The excess also allows legitimate patients to 
innocently (though still illegally) share opioids with co-workers, family, 
and friends. Many people addicted to prescription opioids report getting 
them through a prescription held by someone else (e.g., “my knee is really 
acting up and I left my pills at home, would you mind if . . . ?”).22  
Patients also sometimes sell excess opioids that were legitimately 
prescribed. An individual who has taken, say, only ten pills out of a bottle 
of thirty 7.5mg Percocet tablets after a wisdom tooth surgery has an asset 
worth at least $100 on the black market.23 A chronic-pain patient who 
consistently needs less opioids than prescribed with each refill can 
supplement income by thousands or tens of thousands of dollars a year.24 
 
19. See, e.g., Katherin Eban, Drug Theft Goes Big, FORTUNE (Mar. 31, 2011), 
https://fortune.com/2011/03/31/drug-theft-goes-big [perma.cc/DM7B-
ZATX]. 
20. See generally THOMAS BABOR ET AL., DRUG POLICY AND THE PUBLIC GOOD (2d ed. 
2018). 
21. See Fred Muench, We Must Stop Opioid Overprescribing—Now, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP.: HEALTH (Sept. 6, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://health.usnews.com/
health-care/for-better/articles/2018-09-06/we-must-stop-opioid-
overprescribing-now [https://perma.cc/4X3X-9UP7]. 
22. Rachel N. Lipari & Arthur Hughes, How People Obtain the Prescription Pain 
Relievers They Misuse, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN.: CBHSQ 
REP. (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/
report_2686/ShortReport-2686.html [https://perma.cc/6B4X-NKCU]. 
23. Nabarun Dasgupta et al., Crowdsourcing Black Market Prices For Prescription 
Opioids, 15 J. MED. INTERNET RES. e178 (Aug. 16, 2013), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3758048 
[https://perma.cc/7HPY-8GN9]. 
24. See Humphreys et al., supra note 1. 
Patient deception. There is no objective test for pain, making it an 
easy condition to fake. Many degrees of flummery are possible. A person 
with no pain can invent a condition, or a patient with some real pain can 
exaggerate their suffering in the hopes of being prescribed more potent 
opioids.25 A person can repeatedly con a single prescriber or a whole 
group of prescribers who do not know of each other’s existence.26 Patient 
deception can be driven by the desire to obtain opioids in order to feed an 
addiction, to sell on the black market, or both. 
Prescriber criminality. A very small but very destructive proportion 
of prescribers use their license to function outright as drug dealers, such 
as the “pill mill doctors” who were once prevalent in South Florida.27 
These prescribers advertised same day exams, did not require patient 
identification, operated entirely with cash, and both prescribed opioids 
and filled their own prescriptions on site. These were lucrative criminal 
operations netting hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars a year, and 
all involved a knowing physician participant. Prescribers may also engage 
in illegal conduct because of their own addictions rather than out of pure 
avarice. 
As legal opioids become widely available for misuse, individuals and 
communities can be affected by the interaction of lawful and illicit opioid 
markets. Addicted individuals often become tolerant to the effects of 
prescription opioids to the point that they consume more pills per day 
than they can afford. This leads some of them to engage in behavior they 
would not have contemplated initially, namely using relatively cheaper 
illegal drugs, including heroin. Other prescription-opioid-addicted 
individuals may transition to heroin because the prescriber discovers their 
 
25. See generally SAM QUINONES, DREAMLAND: THE TRUE TALE OF AMERICA’S OPIOID 
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26. See Randy A. Sansone & Lori A. Sansone, Doctor Shopping: A Phenomenon of 
Many Themes, 9 INNOVATIONS CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 42, 43-44 (2012); John M. 
Stogner et al., Deception for Drugs: Self-Reported “Doctor Shopping” Among 
Young Adults, 27 J. AM. BOARD FAM. MED. 583, 590-91 (2014); Although 
Relatively Few, “Doctor Shoppers” Skew Opioid Prescribing, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG 
ABUSE (May 27, 2014), https://archives.drugabuse.gov/news-events/nida-
notes/2014/05/although-relatively-few-doctor-shoppers-skew-opioid-
prescribing [https://perma.cc/84DE-7YD3]. 
27. Press Release, Drug Enforcement Admin., DEA-Led Operation Pill Nation 




addiction and refuses to continue providing them opioids.28 At least in the 
short term, switching from diverted prescription opioids to heroin can 
lower a person’s daily expenditure substantially (until, of course, their 
need for more heroin takes hold).29 
The increasing numbers of Americans addicted to prescription opioids 
was correctly identified as a marketing opportunity by Mexican criminal 
organizations who began dealing heroin in regions of the country where 
heroin markets had long been small or non-existent.30 The legal opioid 
epidemic thus revived illicit opioid markets, which in turn made heroin 
available to individuals who initiated heroin use first rather than after a 
period of prescription opioid addiction. As a result, contrary to the claim 
by pharmaceutical industry advocates that they cannot be held 
responsible for heroin deaths, the increase in opioid prescriptions played a 
role in heroin use even for individuals who never used prescribed 
products.31 
B. Patterns of Use in the United States over Time 
Modern U.S. medicine and its associated regulatory structures (e.g., the 
Food and Drug Administration) emerged in the early 20th century. For the 
first nine decades of that century, opioids were used sparingly, mainly for 
surgery and cancer care.32 In the 1990s, many physicians and patient 
advocates became concerned that pain was often poorly managed, which 
was factually correct then and still is today.33 The pharmaceutical industry 
seized on this moment to promote its products in a broad range of settings 
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29. See Humphreys et al., supra note 1, at 122. 
30. See, e.g., QUINONES, supra note 25, at 40-46. 
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32. For a discussion of the transformation in opioid use in the late 20th century, 
see BARRY MEIER, PAIN KILLER: AN EMPIRE OF DECEIT AND THE ORIGIN OF AMERICA’S 
OPIOID EPIDEMIC (2018). 
33. For an extended treatment of pain management, see NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., 
ENG’G & MED., supra note 16. 
and ways that have no historical parallel: the industry contributed 
financially to multiple professional societies that wrote clinical practice 
guidelines favoring opioids; funded continuing medical education 
programs (often with no acknowledgement of the funding source) that 
encouraged doctors to prescribe opioids more liberally; spent hundreds of 
millions of dollars lobbying legislators to loosen regulatory controls; made 
donations to many regulators (e.g., state medical boards, The Joint 
Commission), and established putatively patient-led advocacy groups who 
supported the industry agenda without revealing the industry’s 
bankrolling of their work.34 Opioid manufacturers, most notably Purdue 
Pharma, unleashed an army of “detailers” who visited doctors’ offices and 
encouraged the prescribing of opioids—as well as gave gifts to physicians, 
which is a legal practice.35 
Purdue Pharma and the broader opioid industry’s campaign was 
spectacularly successful at increasing U.S. opioid prescribing, which rose 
to about a quarter of a billion prescriptions per year.36 This was enough for 
every adult in the country to have their own prescription or to medicate 
the entire population of the country twenty-four hours a day for a month. 
Not surprisingly, as opioid prescribing soared over the last few years, the 
negative consequences of opioids rose as well. Importantly, because 
opioids are not always recorded either on death certificates or in 
emergency room records, the official overdose data understate the 
horrible reality by 20-35%.37 
In analyzing the origins of the U.S. opioid crisis, the obvious 
explanation is the best one: society was flooded with an unprecedented 
number of pharmaceutical opioids, leading many people to become 
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32. For an intriguing account of how the pharmaceutical companies’ 
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addicted. Other factors that may have operated in concord with vastly 




Some observers argue that the opioid epidemic was caused by the 
financial crisis of 2007 to 2008, which deprived many people of their 
economic livelihood and created understandable emotional strain on 
individuals and communities. But the opioid epidemic began ten years 
before the economic crisis, and there was no opioid epidemic to speak of 
during the Great Depression.38 Further, another deadly addiction—to 
cigarettes—declined before, during, and after the 2007 to 2008 financial 
meltdown.39 Moreover, by itself poverty cannot cause addiction in any 
simple sense. To become addicted to a substance a person must first use it, 
and lower-income people have higher abstention rates (usually for 
religious or cultural reasons) than do middle- and higher-income 
individuals.40  
 
38. For more on the argument that the opioid crisis was driven in part by social 
and economic factors, see Nabarun Dasgupta et al., Opioid Crisis: No Easy Fix 
to Its Social and Economic Determinants, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 182 (2018). 
39. Current Cigarette Smoking Among Adults in the United States, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/
tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/adult_data/cig_smoking/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/23T8-JANW]. 
40. See Keith Humphreys & Elizabeth Gifford, Religion, Spirituality and the 
Troublesome Use of Substances, in RETHINKING SUBSTANCE ABUSE: WHAT THE 
All that said, a modified, more plausible, version of the economic 
determinants hypothesis would be that, when access to an addictive 
substance is rapidly rising (as opioids, but not tobacco, was during the 
financial crisis), those users of that substance who live in economically 
difficult circumstances are more likely to progress from use to addiction. 
There can be multiple mechanisms behind this: fewer competing rewards 
in the environments of lower-income people; greater subjective relief from 
relatively higher life stress upon drug administration; more temptation for 
economic reasons to deal pills; and selection into social class effects.41 
III. GOVERNING OPIOIDS: WHAT IT MEANS TO REGULATE A LEGALLY 
AVAILABLE, ADDICTIVE SUBSTANCE WHICH CAN BE BENEFICIAL OR 
HARMFUL  
When American society eventually responds to public health 
challenges such as the opioid crisis, policymakers can use a variety of tools 
with a range of effects. Criminal law enforcement, regulatory policy and 
enforcement, private insurance practices, and civil liability all have the 
capacity to influence public health and the practice of medicine. All these 
domains may be implicated in society’s approach to the prescription of 
opioids—an issue affecting a variety of economic and societal interests. 
Consider, for example, how opioid prescribing is “supposed to work.” In 
other words, who is in a position to affect access to a contingently lawful, 
addictive product? What are the forces that are intended to help doctors 
prescribe opioids safely and effectively such that criminal law need not get 
involved because no public safety threat is created? 
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et al., The Intersection of Extreme Poverty and Familial Mental Health in the 
United States, 15 SOC. WORK MENTAL HEALTH 677 (2017); David A. Brent et al., 
Association Between Parental Medical Claims for Opioid Prescriptions and Risk 
of Suicide Attempt by Their Children, 76 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 941 (2019); Jeffrey 
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A. Overview of the Key Players and Legal Arrangements 
The benefits and costs of drug use have spurred the creation of a 
variety of federal and state legal arrangements to regulate the supply of 
products available to the public. At the federal level, the Controlled 
Substances Act gives authority to the DEA and the FDA to regulate the use 
of pharmaceuticals, subject to congressional oversight.42 DEA regulation 
covers manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies as well as physicians, 
who must be registered with the DEA in order to prescribe controlled 
substances. Physician registration usually requires state licensing. The 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act also gives the FDA power to consider the 
potential for misuse (“abuse liability”) at the stage of new drug approval. 
Moreover, the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 
gave the Administration power to put in place risk-minimization plans that 
restrict prescriptions, dispensing, or use of a drug and require 
manufacturers to advise prescribers and patients on proper use. The 
Department of Justice, primarily through U.S. Attorney’s Offices, also 
regulates the misuse of pharmaceutical products through criminal and 
civil actions. 
These statutes are implemented by an alphabet soup of federal 
administrative bodies with overlapping authority and different agendas. 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) establishes 
voluntary clinical practice treatment guidelines for physicians. The 
Department of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA) also produce 
clinical practice guidelines as well as operate large health care systems 
that effectively make them regulators of access to pharmaceuticals for 
present or former members of the military, respectively. The Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) regulate access through setting 
reimbursement rates. The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration (SAMHSA) within the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) provides information about best practices and 
funding for, among other things, state efforts to provide addiction 
treatment. SAMHSA also collaborates with the FDA, DEA, and White House 
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) on programs providing 
safe disposal options for prescription drugs and on prescription drug 
monitoring programs. 
 
42. For a discussion of the regulatory transformation effected by the CSA, see 
Joseph Spillane & William B. McAllister, Keeping the Lid On: A Century of Drug 
Regulation and Control, 70 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 5 (2003). 
State boards of pharmacy regulate pharmacists, usually controlling 
licensing and establishing professional standards as well as, in some cases, 
promulgating regulations. Improper prescription practices may also 
implicate hospital pharmacy licensure or other providers.43 Medical 
licensure boards establish standards and regulate the practice of 
physicians but are limited, in most cases, to responding to complaints 
rather than proactively seeking out improper prescribing habits.44 The 
Federation of State Medical Boards has also established a model policy for 
the use of controlled substances.45 An increasing number of states have 
prescriber-use mandates that require providers to check a state database 
under specific circumstances to make sure their prescriptions do not 
facilitate, misuse, or create risk of drug-drug interaction46 (e.g., even taken 
as directed, simultaneous prescriptions of opioids and benzodiazepines 
carry risk of overdose).47 As discussed below, these monitoring programs 
have been a domain of particular growth—though not without difficulty—
in addressing opioid misuse across all fifty states. 
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47. See Rebecca L. Haffajee et al., Mandatory Use of Prescription Drug Monitoring 
Programs, 313 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 891 (2015); Eric C. Sun et al., Association 
Between Concurrent Use of Prescription Opioids and Benzodiazepines and 
Overdose: Retrospective Analysis, 356 BMJ j760 (2017). 
B. Forces Shaping Opioid Prescription Practices 
The preceding description underscores how critical actors’ medical 
professionals are in this system, given that many of the other actors and 
institutions in a position to influence access to opioids operate only 
indirectly by affecting prescriber practices. Moreover, prescribers who are 
determined to evade legal or ethical requirements—or who have an 
incentive to engage in some kind of willful blindness—are likely to 
complicate even the most carefully designed regulatory goals. 
In many respects, physicians are like any other group of workers: they 
have preferences for how to do their jobs but also have to respond to 
externally-established demands and expectations. Sometimes those 
internal and external forces are in alignment, and sometimes they 
compete. Among the most important internally generated goals within 
medicine are doctors’ desire for beneficence, trust, and responsible 
autonomy. The most important external forces shaping doctors are non-
physician regulators, payors, and patients. This Section describes each of 
these forces in turn. 
1. Forces Internal to the Medical Profession: Beneficence, Trust, 
Responsible Autonomy 
Beneficence. “To cure sometimes, to relieve often, to comfort always” 
is a medical aphorism that captures the aspiration of the profession and 
those in it to do good or, failing that, to invoke a different aphorism, 
primum non nocere. Doctors tend to want their actions to benefit patients –
– sometimes out of empathy, sometimes out of professionalism, sometimes 
out of vanity, and sometimes out of a mix of the three. The critical point is 
that it is quite likely that the overwhelming majority of doctors who 
increased their issuance of opioid prescriptions to harmful levels were 
convinced that they were helping their patients. 
Trust. Physicians want to be trusted by patients so that they can 
provide them informed care, and they want to be trusted by the broader 
society because that trust underlies the grant of status and autonomy. 
Although most Americans continue to trust physicians,48 the opioid 
epidemic has almost certainly damaged that trust for some segments of 
the public because some patients became addicted to opioids by following 
their doctor’s instructions. This helps explain why a previously 
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unthinkable intrusion on doctors’ autonomy in 2017— states and a major 
pharmaceutical chain limiting opioid prescriptions for certain conditions 
to 7 days49—resulted in far less public backlash than would have been the 
case twenty years ago. 
Responsible autonomy. Relative to other occupations, even 
professionalized ones, physicians have a high level of autonomy in their 
decision-making. When organized medicine emerged in the late 19th 
century, this autonomy was virtually limitless.50 Indeed, no less a figure 
than William James argued that even state licensing of physicians was an 
unreasonable encroachment on professional freedom.51 Half a century 
later, the American Medical Association helped torpedo President 
Truman’s proposal for national health insurance because it feared 
(accurately) that third-party payors would intrude on physician 
autonomy.52 Modern physicians have high autonomy, but within informal 
constraints designed to promote responsible practice. These include a 
desire to follow scientific evidence and a tradition of valuing the opinions 
of their peers. 
2. Forces External to Medicine: Non-Physician Regulators, Payors, 
and Patients—”Trust But Verify” 
Non-physician regulators. Reflecting its historical success at 
preserving its autonomy, medicine is to a significant extent self-regulated. 
State medical boards, for example, are run primarily by physicians. 
However, there are non-physician regulators, the most important of which 
for opioid prescribing is the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration. To 
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prescribe controlled substances, a physician needs a DEA license and must 
submit to the possibility of DEA inspections. It is extremely rare for the 
DEA to withdraw a physician’s prescribing license, but the possibility is 
frightening enough to cause concern (and some resentment). The other 
key non-physician regulators to whom physicians must be responsive are 
organizations that accredit heath care organizations. The best-known 
example is The Joint Commission, which at one point put significant 
pressure on hospitals to be more responsive to patient pain.53 
Payors. Payors always shape prescribing. Examples of how they exert 
control include, for instance, a Medicaid program refusing or agreeing to 
reimburse non-opioid pain management services (e.g., physical therapy), a 
private insurance company expanding or contracting its level of utilization 
review, and a pharmacy-benefits management company negotiating 
generic drug coverage for an employer-provided health insurance plan. 
Payors also affect opioid prescribing indirectly, through economic 
incentives: physicians in the United States (and Canada, which also has an 
opioid epidemic) are generally paid by volume of services provided, and 
writing a prescription takes little time compared to other medical 
procedures such as clinical observations. 
Patients. Outside of a hospital setting in which opioids might be 
administered under close supervision and with complete control over 
access, doctors have to share control of prescribing with patients. That is, 
patients can refuse to fill a prescription or fill it but not follow it (e.g., take 
pills more often than directed). Patients may also have strong preferences 
regarding different medications, which doctors must negotiate. 
Despite patients’ formal right to sue doctors, a patient is quite unlikely 
to prevail merely because she disagrees with her doctor about whether the 
patient merits an opioid prescription. They could conceivably sue if the 
physician deviated from the custom of the profession and that deviation 
caused a cognizable injury—but patient retaliation in the event of a 
disagreement with the patient’s doctor is easier today even in the absence 
of litigation. Many hospitals and clinics survey patients about their 
experience, some of which then feeds back into financial incentives, such 
as by influencing doctors’ annual bonuses.54 Moreover, digital platforms 
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for aggregating reviews, such as Yelp.com, allow angry patients to 
complain about doctors, leaving reputational consequences even if there is 
no direct financial effect.55 
The internal and external forces just described are imperfect in many 
respects. Yet at the same time they created guardrails that historically 
made it less likely that the health care system would create an epidemic 
with massive public harm. These forces failed as never before during the 
opioid epidemic, opening the question of whether criminal law was 
required to enter the breach. 
C. The Strengths and Limitations of Criminal Enforcement 
As a general matter, criminal enforcement plays an important role in 
regulating undesirable conduct, including the illicit distribution and use of 
opioids. But public health problems are not guaranteed to trigger 
appropriate criminal justice responses. Moreover, questions about the role 
of criminal enforcement in addressing public health problems inevitably 
raise broader issues associated with the longer-term use of the criminal 
justice system to affect drug consumption. Efforts to describe, or 
eventually to confine, criminal enforcement to a narrow “malum in se” 
category—involving offenses such as murder or fraud, for example—tend 
not to fit closely with how American society actually uses criminal law.56 
Indeed, the fact that white-collar regulatory enforcement is possible (in 
domains such as environmental regulation and finance) illustrates the 
breadth of criminal law. Similarly, the drug enforcement infrastructure has 
criminal law at its core, including provisions to address complex, group-
enabled criminal schemes. 
This framework as it currently exists is obviously not without its costs. 
But it applies, or can be made to apply, to many individual and collective 
behaviors associated with the opioid crisis. As we shall see, one of the most 
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important and timely questions involving the role of criminal enforcement 
in opioid-related enforcement concerns the apparently different response 
to the present crisis in contrast to the vigorous law enforcement response 
to drug problems in the 1980s and 1990s. Calibrating the appropriate level 
and type of criminal justice response remains a challenge and underscores 
the complexity of understanding how the legal system more generally 
affects the behavior of the different actors that shape the availability of 
opioids. 
1. Criminal Enforcement Tools to Target Opioid-Related Offenses 
In pursuing physicians, pharmacists, and nurses involved in allegedly 
overprescribing opioids, U.S. attorneys have charged, both directly and 
using aiding and abetting theories under 18 U.S.C. § 2, distribution of 
controlled substances resulting in death in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; 
conspiracy to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; and health care 
fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347.57 The federal government has also 
brought cases against physicians, nurses, and pharmaceutical 
representatives running “pill mills” for conspiracy to commit healthcare 
fraud, distribute controlled substances, commit mail and wire fraud, 
defraud the United States as well as for racketeering and RICO violations.58 
Prosecutors have also brought money laundering charges against 
physicians and pharmacists alleged to have run “pill mills.”59 
States and the federal government have also used the threat of 
criminal prosecution to curb the sale of opioids from internet-based 
pharmacies. A prominent example is FDA warning letters sent to online 
pharmacies marketing non-approved opioids or selling prescription 
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opioids to individuals without a prescription.60 Because even the 
sketchiest of internet prescription drug sales typically involve legal 
intermediaries, such as banks that issue credit cards and process 
transactions or shipping companies that deliver drugs, this provides 
another venue for potential federal prosecution. For example, United 
Parcel Service recently avoided DOJ prosecution by forgoing $40 million in 
internet drug sale revenue and agreeing to stop delivering suspicious 
shipments from internet pharmacies.61 
Recently, the Department of Justice formed a task force to fight the 
prescription opioid crisis, targeting misconduct at all levels from 
manufacturers to pharmacies to healthcare providers.62 The Department 
of Justice has brought criminal charges against high-level executives at 
Insys Pharmaceuticals, which produced and promoted potent legal 
opioids. The initial indictment alleged racketeering conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 
1962(d)), mail and wire fraud conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1349), and 
conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371) to violate the Anti-Kickback Statute (42 U.S.C. 
§ 1320a-7b).63 At the urging of Judge Burroughs, prosecutors have 
narrowed the indictment to just the racketeering conspiracy.64 
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2. Criminal Enforcement in Broader Context 
The preceding example underscores the distinction between the 
extent of criminal enforcement tools available and the more complex mix 
of aggressive and limited enforcement actually pursued. Indeed, one of the 
common threads in the law-related commentary on the opioid crisis is the 
tension between treating the epidemic as a criminal versus public health 
issue. This prevalent framing of the policy choice obscures the important 
distinction between how society deals with traffickers versus users. If two 
drug dealers are shooting it out over a particular street corner, no one 
thinks the best solution is to call a psychiatrist. The split in philosophy is 
about responses to drug users, particularly addicted ones. The point of 
view associated with the War on Drugs is that such users should be 
arrested and punished whereas the public health perspective views 
addicted individuals as ill and in need of rehabilitation rather than 
punishment.65 
The Obama Administration (in which both authors served), sought to 
combat the opioid crisis through “targeted activities, funding new and 
unprecedented networks of law enforcement and public health 
partnerships to address the heroin threat; targeting heroin and 
prescription opioid traffickers and the illegal opioid supply chain; and 
 
65. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS, 
FACING ADDICTION IN AMERICA: THE SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT ON ALCOHOL, DRUGS, 
AND HEALTH 7-1 to 7-17 (2016); Howard K. Koh et al., A Smarter War on 
Drugs, 320 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2301, 2301-02 (2018); Jeffrey A. Singer, Harm 
Reduction: Shifting from a War on Drugs to a War on Drug-Related Deaths, 
CATO INST. (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-
analysis/harm-reduction-shifting-war-drugs-war-drug-related-deaths 
[https://perma.cc/72PA-3Q7Y]; Betsy Pearl & Maritza Perez, Ending the War 
on Drugs, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (June 27, 2018, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-
justice/reports/2018/06/27/452786/ending-war-drugs 
[https://perma.cc/XG89-XD5D]; see also Lisa D. Moore & Amy Elkavich, 
Who’s Using and Who’s Doing Time: Incarceration, the War on Drugs, and 
Public Health, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 782 (2008). But see German Lopez, The 
New War on Drugs, VOX (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2017/9/5/16135848/drug-war-opioid-epidemic 
[https://perma.cc/K326-W3HD]; Sejal Singh & Alisha Jarwala, Nuisance 
Ordinances: The New Frontier in Social Control, CURRENT AFF. (Aug. 6, 2019), 
https://www.currentaffairs.org/2019/08/nuisance-ordinances-the-new-
frontier-in-social-control [https://perma.cc/L8T8-SD58]. 
thwarting doctor-shopping and disrupting so-called ‘pill mills.’”66 At the 
same time, the Administration emphasized that opioid addiction was “a 
public health problem that requires a public health response.”67 This 
included “working with law enforcement to help people get into treatment 
instead of into jail,” “expand[ing] access to substance use disorder 
treatment through the Affordable Care Act,” getting first responders to 
carry the overdose rescue drug naloxone, and “chang[ing] the rules to 
allow more types of health care providers to provide evidence-based 
opioid treatment.”68 The Trump Administration’s President’s Commission 
on Combatting Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis has similarly 
emphasized the “public health crisis” of opioids.69 Yet the President 
himself and his first attorney general, Jeff Sessions, have advocated a 
1980s-style enforcement approach, including longer sentences and 
expansive use of capital punishment.70 
Law-related commentary on the opioid crisis is overwhelmingly 
focused on discrete legal issues, including the burdens to the legal system 
created by opioid misuse and addiction. Few if any scholars have offered a 
critical analysis of the mix of civil litigation, criminal enforcement, and 
regulatory tools that comprise the national response to the opioid crisis.71 
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70. See, e.g., Eli Rosenberg, Trump Is ‘Most Excited’ About Death Penalty for Drug 




71. See, though, the pieces collected in the Summer 2018 issue of the Journal of 
Law, Medicine and Ethics. E.g., Andrew W. Parker et al., State Responses to the 
Opioid Crisis, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 367 (2018); Rachel L. Rothberg & Kate 
Stith, The Opioid Crisis and Federal Criminal Prosecution, 46 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 
292 (2018); Alex Wang & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Government Patent Use to 
Rather than focusing on the systemic interactions between different legal 
tools, or on how legal arrangements affect root causes, much of the law-
related commentary treats law as a dependent rather than independent 
variable, focusing on ways to address the epidemic’s strain on the legal 
system. 
For instance, scholars have chronicled a variety of specific strategies 
currently employed against the opioid crisis. As one example, the DEA’s 
“360 Strategy” unsurprisingly focuses on law enforcement efforts. The 
DEA employs a “three-pronged approach to combating the epidemic 
through: (1) coordinated Law Enforcement actions against drug cartels 
and traffickers in specific communities; (2) Diversion Control actions 
against DEA registrants operating outside the law and long-term 
engagement with pharmaceutical drug manufacturers, wholesalers, 
pharmacies, and practitioners; and, (3) Community Outreach through local 
partnerships that empower communities to take back affected 
neighborhoods.”72 The DEA rolled out this strategy in Pittsburgh, St. Louis, 
Milwaukee, and other affected communities.73 The Department of Justice 
has elsewhere invested in evaluating various law enforcement strategies 
to combat the epidemic, such as prescription-drug monitoring programs,74 
forensic analysis of drug ledgers,75 and enhanced sentencing requirements 
for drug trafficking that results in death.76 
Don Stemen has placed the federal and state response to the opioid 
epidemic in the larger historical context of U.S. drug policy, noting that 
despite some signs that drug addiction is increasingly viewed as a public 
health problem, it remains unclear whether the country will 
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Sept. 2016, at 45-52. 
fundamentally alter its approach to drug policy.77 Ameet Sarpatwari et al. 
have argued that policymakers should probe the root cause of the overuse 
of opioids. They propose several ways to solve the legal and regulatory 
problems, such as having the federal government challenge patents, 
imposing time restrictions on citizen petitions filed by opioid 
manufacturers to protect their commercial interests, requiring sample 
sharing for bioequivalence studies, and promoting cost-effectiveness 
research and dissemination.78 Timothy S. Coyne has noted that in stark 
contrast to the crack-cocaine epidemic, the legislative reaction to the 
current opioid epidemic “has generally been far more treatment-oriented, 
with some exceptions.”79 
3. Contrasting Responses to the Opioid Epidemic and the “Drug 
War” of the 1980s and 1990s 
The extent of enforcement-related action—or lack of action—
regarding opioid issues in the last decade contrasts with the more punitive 
response associated with drug enforcement during the 1980s and 1990s. 
One possible explanation is that the severity of the epidemic “has worn 
down historic Republican resistance to public health driven drug policy.”80 
Another proffered explanation is the demographics of prescription drug 
users: the epidemics of the 1980s and 1990s affected mainly low-income 
African Americans (crack cocaine) and low-income, rural whites 
(methamphetamine), whereas the opioid epidemic includes a large 
representation of middle-class, white individuals with more political and 
social capital. Indeed, whites accounted for eighty-five percent of all opioid 
overdose deaths in 2014.81 There is also the unique nature of the crisis: 
As patients continue to seek pain relief, the rise of opioid abuse 
calls into question medicine’s approach to pain management and 
creates new conflicts in United States approaches to illegal drug 
use. Indeed, the question of how to address prescription drug 
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misuse falls to both health care professionals and criminal justice 
system actors and creates conflicts between legitimate approaches 
for treating pain and the punishment for engaging in the illegal use 
of drugs. Moreover, because the illegal use of drugs in this context 
often begins from a legitimate, legal use of such drugs, the 
response has been more focused on treatment than punishment, 
marking a significant change in both national rhetoric and practice 
around drug abuse.82 
Although we acknowledge the importance of these distinctions, and 
particularly the complicated impact of a drug’s licit uses, one should not 
presume that a public health approach to opioid addiction is now 
triumphant. The opioid crisis is pervasive in rural areas, which often lack 
adequate social and health care services, leaving jail as the default option 
for many addicted individuals who commit low-level offenses. Anderson 
and Reinsmith-Jones touch briefly on this issue and note how lessons from 
the past war on drugs drive criminal justice approaches to the opioid 
epidemic today.83 As drug-related incarceration in rural areas rises, it has 
been dropping in urban areas. These patterns likely reflect a mix of factors, 
including growing public concern over opioid-related crime in rural areas 
and changing criminal justice priorities in urban areas. 
An interesting perspective on the opioid crisis—and the prosecutions 
that could have happened but did not—is described in A Prosecutor’s 
Perspective on a Public Health Crisis, by the Commonwealth’s Attorney for 
the County of Henrico: 
It is unrealistic to think that those of us in Public Safety (law-
enforcement and prosecutors) would simply turn our backs on 
people who break the law. It is unrealistic to think that Public 
Safety and the Courts do not have a role to play in this opioid 
epidemic, but the definition of that role is delicate—the attempt to 
balance the interests of a public health crisis revolving around a 
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July 2017, 42, 47-49, https://doi.org/10.11114/ijsss.v5i7.2495 
[https://perma.cc/T95K-VWS5]. While this analysis correctly recognizes 
that some recalibration in the use of criminal enforcement has occurred 
since the height of the 1980s drug war, it does not fully explore the socially 
optimal role of criminal enforcement in addressing the role or responsibility 
of drug manufacturers, distributors, and doctors in the opioid crisis. 
criminal activity. Yet, that is what I—an elected official, a 
prosecutor—am asked to do.84 
Another factor shaping the response to the opioid crisis is the 
remarkable lack of violence associated with it relative to the 
methamphetamine and crack cocaine epidemics. This may in part be 
pharmacological: opioids are soporific, whereas stimulants such as 
methamphetamine and crack cocaine increase agitation and aggression. It 
is also in part due to opioids being distributed by people who wear white 
coats and carry stethoscopes rather than people who wear gang colors and 
carry guns. Violence tends to draw strong cries from voters of all classes 
and races for more punitive responses to drugs, and the lack of violence 
around opioids has not created this political pressure. 
Some of the nuances and tradeoffs associated with the role of criminal 
enforcement in addressing the opioid crisis are not lost on observers of 
and participants in the criminal justice system.85 An example comes from 
Tim Coyne, a public defender in Virginia: 
In our community, it really started with law enforcement—our 
task force came forward and said we cannot arrest our way out of 
this problem. We have a problem, our deaths are rising, people are 
overdosing on our streets. We have to look about it and treat it 
differently. So with law enforcement, our public health system we 
have one hospital that serves our area, our region, they 
contributed—we have the court system, commonwealth attorneys, 
defense attorneys, private community providers, our community 
started meeting together to try and address it, which ultimately 
developed into the Northern Shenandoah Valley Substance Abuse 
Coalition. We were able to get some funding from the localities—
Winchester City, Frederick County, Clark County, and Valley 
Health. It enabled us to start a drug treatment court, which our 
first docket was held August 16th. Drug courts aren’t anything 
new . . . . And a lot of what we experienced was trying to change 
the mindset and peoples’ approach in what they thought about 
addicts. It wasn’t the junkie in the alley that it used to be. It was 
now fathers, sons, mothers, daughters, peoples’ children. They 
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could put a different face on it and that’s really what has 
changed.86 
Adding further gloss to these insights, one study evaluated how the 
mainstream news media has described the phenomenon of opioid 
addiction. According to the study, the news media more often frame the 
problem as a criminal justice issue—despite the fact that prevention-
oriented approaches, such as prescription-drug monitoring programs, 
were mentioned more frequently in the latter years of the study.87 
Ultimately, prosecutors could have deployed a broad range of criminal 
justice-related tools to focus on opioid-related issues early in the epidemic.  
As with all criminal enforcement strategies, any criminal prosecution or 
related forfeiture would face—by design—procedural and substantive 
limitations. To the extent public officials might have sought strategies with 
fewer procedural and substantive limitations, such as expanding 
regulatory measures limiting access to opioids and giving public officials 
the ability to pursue enforcement, these measures were likely to have 
faced opposition from the pharmaceutical industry. 
D. Challenges Associated with Civil Regulatory Enforcement 
Criminal and civil regulatory enforcement are both substitutes and 
complements. Regulatory policy can make use of various levers for 
controlling the prescription, distribution, and misuse of opioids that may 
be available in light of the organization of medical care and pharmaceutical 
distribution in the United States. The government may regulate by 
imposing civil penalties or constraints for violating health-protecting rules 
grounded in statutory requirements. Jurisdictions can also enact new 
statutes and rules requiring compliance with some administrative scheme 
to limit availability of some drug (as with nominally legalized marijuana), 
changing tax policy, or allowing the public to pursue private rights of 
action. 
Regulatory rules can address substantive conduct directly capable of 
affecting health (e.g., prescriptions) or can involve compliance with 
monitoring mechanisms designed to gather information about possible 
criminal or regulatory violations. Violations of federal regulatory 
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requirements can trigger civil penalties or criminal prosecution. A variety 
of state laws also apply.88 Together with the federal efforts, these civil 
regulatory actions demonstrate a high degree of law-enforcement interest 
in the problem. Nonetheless, as discussed below, enforcement efforts face 
a variety of challenges—in part because of the difficulty of gathering data 
and the challenges (by design) of proving the relevant criminal statutes’ 
intent requirements. But political economy can also dilute how regulatory 
policies emerge, the breadth of their scope, and, particularly, their 
enforcement. 
1. A Legislative Example: DEA Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ 
Registrations 
A recent legislative example involving the DEA and the Ensuring 
Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016 (the “Act”) 
illustrates how difficult it is to achieve meaningful changes in the 
regulatory environment. The Act was enacted “[t]o improve enforcement 
efforts related to prescription drug diversion and abuse” and has two 
major parts: (1) revisions to the Controlled Substance Act’s registration 
process and (2) the commissioning of a report to Congress on the opioid 
crisis.89 It made three major changes to the Controlled Substances Act. 
First, the Act amended the Controlled Substances Act’s registration 
requirements under section 303, 21 U.S.C. § 823, to define the phrase 
 
88. State civil suits against manufacturers, distributors, or pharmacies have 
generally alleged some common law-related causes of action, discussed 
below, such as public nuisance, common law fraud, and negligent 
misrepresentation, negligence, as well as violation of state unfair business 
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requirements goes to negligence. See 21 C.F.R. § 1301.71(a). State attorneys 
general have also brought cases against drug representatives who 
participated in kickback schemes. See, e.g., Bill Wichert, Insys Sales Rep 
Pleads Guilty to Opioid Kickback Scheme, LAW360 (May 30, 2018, 6:52 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1048620/insys-sales-rep-pleads-guilty-
to-opioid-kickback-scheme [https://perma.cc/KSF7-MEQU] (reporting a 
guilty plea by a drug representative in New Jersey). See generally Andrew M. 
Parker et al., State Responses to the Opioid Crisis, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 367 
(2018). 
89. Ensuring Patient Access and Effective Drug Enforcement Act of 2016, Pub. L. 
No. 114-145, 130 Stat. 354 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq.). 
“factors as may be relevant to and consistent with public health and 
safety.” According to the Act, the phrase means “factors that are relevant to 
and consistent with the findings contained in section 101 [21 U.S.C. § 
801].”90 Section 101 of the Controlled Substances Act contains 
congressional findings and declarations regarding controlled substances.91 
Second, the Act defined the standard required to immediately suspend 
pharmaceutical manufacturers’ registrations. Section 304(d) of the 
Controlled Substances Act92 allows the Attorney General, at his or her 
discretion, to revoke a registration to manufacture, distribute, or dispense 
a controlled substance “in cases where he finds that there is an imminent 
danger to the public health and safety.” The Act added a definition for the 
phrase “imminent danger to the public health or safety,” which now 
means, “due to the failure of the registrant to maintain effective controls 
against diversion or otherwise comply with the obligations of a registrant 
under this title or title III, there is a substantial likelihood of an immediate 
threat that death, serious bodily harm, or abuse of a controlled substance 
will occur in the absence of an immediate suspension of the registration.”93 
Although the Attorney General could previously interpret “imminent 
danger to the public health or safety” under his or her own terms, the law 
now requires a “substantial likelihood of an immediate threat” before the 
Attorney General can revoke a pharmaceutical company’s registration. 
Third, the Act establishes requirements for an order to show cause 
under the Controlled Substances Act, in situations other than the 
“imminent danger” provision in section 304(d) of the Controlled 
Substances Act. Before the Attorney General revokes a registration in 
instances where there is no imminent danger, the Attorney General “shall 
serve upon the applicant or registrant an order to show cause why 
registration should not be denied, revoked, or suspended.”94 The 
Controlled Substances Act previously stated that “[a] failure to comply 
with section 823(g)(1) of this title [regarding the heightened registration 
requirements for practitioners dispensing narcotic drugs for narcotic 
treatment] may be treated . . . as grounds for immediate suspension of a 
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registration.”95 The Act deleted this provision, allowing for immediate 
suspension of registrations for narcotic drugs. The Act also instituted a 
number of requirements for the order to show cause. Any order to show 
cause must contain a statement of the basis for the denial, revocation, or 
suspension of a corrective action plan; direct the applicant or registrant to 
appear before the attorney general at a time and place stated in the order; 
and notify the applicant or registrant of the opportunity to submit a 
corrective action plan.96 The Attorney General must consider the 
registrant’s corrective action plan before taking action.97 
Finally, the Act directs a variety of agencies within HHS, along with the 
DEA Administrator and the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Veterans 
Affairs, to submit a report to Congress that identifies, among other things, 
“obstacles to legitimate patient access to controlled substances”; “issues 
with diversion of controlled substances”; and “how collaboration between 
federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies and the 
pharmaceutical industry can benefit patients and prevent diversion and 
abuse of controlled substances.”98 The Act requires the agencies to consult 
with a variety of stakeholders in preparing the report, including law 
enforcement, pharmacies, drug manufacturers, healthcare providers, 
insurance companies, and wholesale drug distributors.99 
In combination, these changes remove discretion from the DEA to 
suspend the registrations of pharmaceutical companies under the 
Controlled Substance Act and heighten the level of proof required to 
pursue immediate enforcement action against pharmaceutical companies. 
The statute had its origins in a May 2014 bill introduced by 
Representative Tom Marino (R-PA).100 H.R. 4709 had many of the same 
provisions as the eventually passed Act: it defined “factors as may be 
relevant to and consistent with the public health and safety,” added 
requirements for orders to show cause, and called for a report to 
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Congress.101 H.R. 4709, however, had an even more specific definition of 
“imminent danger to the public health or safety” as meaning that 
controlled substances: 
(A) will continue to be intentionally distributed or dispensed— 
(i) outside the usual course of professional practice; or 
(ii) in a manner that poses a present or foreseeable risk of serious 
adverse health consequences or death; or 
(B) will continue to be intentionally diverted outside of legitimate 
distribution channels.102 
The bill passed the House, but stalled in the Senate.103 The DEA 
“mobilized to defeat Marino’s measure,” and an internal DEA memo “noted 
that the bill essentially [would] eliminate[] the agency’s power to file 
immediate suspension orders of drug shipments.”104 
The following year, Representative Marino introduced a second 
version of his bill, H.R. 471.105 H.R. 471 again mirrored the Act’s provisions 
but proffered a new definition of “imminent danger to the public health or 
safety” as meaning: 
in the absence of an immediate suspension order, controlled 
substances will continue to be distributed or dispensed by a registrant 
who knows or should know through fulfilling the obligations of the 
registrant under this Act— 
(A) the dispensing is outside the usual course of professional practice; 
(B) the distribution or dispensing poses a present or foreseeable risk 
of adverse health consequences or death due to the abuse or misuse of the 
controlled substances; or 
(C) the controlled substances will continue to be diverted outside of 
legitimate distribution channels.106 
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H.R. 471 was received in the Senate and referred to the Committee on 
the Judiciary.107 The DEA was reportedly in negotiations with the staff of 
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) to amend the bill for the Senate’s 
consideration.108 The eventually enacted bill was introduced by Senator 
Hatch as S. 483 on February 12, 2015.109 The bill changed the definition of 
“imminent danger” to require the DEA to show that a company’s conduct 
posed a “substantial likelihood of an immediate threat” of death, serious 
bodily harm, or drug abuse before the agency could seek a suspension 
order.110 The bill also required the DEA to consider a company’s corrective 
action plan before taking action.111 Senators Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), 
Marco Rubio (R-FL), David Vitter (R-LA), and Bill Cassidy (R-LA) joined as 
cosponsors.112 
The bill was supported by Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) and 
reported out of the Committee on the Judiciary on February 11, 2016, 
without an accompanying written report.113 It passed in the Senate by 
unanimous consent on March 17, 2016.114 It then passed in the House 
without objection on April 12, 2016, and was signed by the President on 
April 19, 2016.115 
Though the Senate bill did not generate any written committee report, 
its early version in the House, H.R. 471, did include a report. The House 
Report stated H.R. 471 “would help prevent prescription drug abuse, while 
ensuring that patients have access to needed medications by fostering 
better collaboration between drug manufacturers, wholesalers, 
pharmacies, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA).”116 The report characterized the bill as 
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clarifying “rules for enforcement agencies and for providers . . . by 
providing certainty with how Federal authorities will apply the law when 
undertaking enforcement actions, and by increasing the investment that 
private industry must make to ensure the integrity of the system.”117 
The passage of the Act illustrates the kind of regulatory-capture-
related pressures associated with prescription opioid legislation. As 
revealed by investigative journalists at the Washington Post and 60 
Minutes, the DEA had been pressuring opioid distribution companies who 
shipped millions of pills to very small towns and did not fulfill their 
responsibility to halt and report such suspicious shipments.118 Those 
distributors donated heavily to politicians, including Congressman Marino, 
who essentially prevented the DEA from holding them responsible. When 
this was revealed, the public outcry forced Congressman Marino to 
withdraw from consideration for serving as President Trump’s Director of 
the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy. But the fact that he 
was nominated for such a post in the first place is a tribute to the 
industry’s political clout. 
The Act has had other consequences as well. At oral argument during a 
D.C. Circuit case against Walgreens, 119 the panel appeared to question the 
legality of the DEA’s suspension of Walgreens’s narcotics shipments from a 
Florida warehouse in September 2012.120 No public written decision ever 
resulted from the case, however, as an order was filed under seal on April 
24, 2013 and the parties stipulated to a dismissal on June 11, 2013.121 
Linden Barber, a former DEA lawyer and executive at Cardinal Health, 
cited to the Walgreens case in arguing about the need for a clearer legal 
definition of the DEA’s imminent danger standard.122 
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Depending on how the FDA interprets the FDCA, the scope of safety 
regulation may or may not encompass addiction risk. A “satisficing” 
strategy may focus safety on simply assessing whether a product 
incorporates a mechanism to slow down the release of a psychoactive 
compound affecting the brain, and not on, say, how easy to defeat such a 
safety mechanism is, or what risk may be associated with addiction that 
later triggers interest in illicit products such as heroin. 
E. Tort Law and Civil Litigation 
In March 2019, the State of Oklahoma settled a tort lawsuit against 
Purdue Pharma and the Sackler family on the eve of trial. The suit targeted 
Purdue, the Sacklers, and several other defendants for actions associated 
with the development, promotion, and sale of OxyContin. As part of the 
$270 million settlement, some of the defendants agreed to fund a new 
center for addiction and treatment at Oklahoma State University.123 In May 
of 2019, Teva Pharmaceuticals also settled with Oklahoma for $85 million; 
the state’s case against Johnson & Johnson just resulted in a $465 million 
judgment. Earlier in the year, documents released in a Massachusetts 
lawsuit brought by the state Attorney General revealed how—when 
evidence of OxyContin abuse mounted in 2001, nineteen years before 
Oklahoma settled—one of the members of the family that owned Purdue 
Pharma sought to encourage the company to blame the individuals who 
were becoming addicted.124 These examples highlight why any model of 
public health policy must account for the continuing relevance of civil 
lawsuits, and particularly tort remedies, in structuring incentives and 
generating information shaping the public’s ability to understand how the 
legal system confronts public health crises. What the lawsuits in 
Oklahoma, Massachusetts, and other states also reveal—as we explain 
below—are all the contingencies that model would also need to include 
given the many delays, procedural constraints, and practical limitations 
that also characterize the role of civil lawsuits in the political economy of 
public health law. 
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Tort law forces wrongdoers to compensate victims of harm as defined 
by common law concepts such as (for negligence) whether a duty exists 
between the victim and the alleged wrongdoer, whether the duty was 
breached, and whether the breach proximately harmed the victim. 
Although tort law appears on its face to concern itself with what recourse 
individuals have for harms already sustained, its consequences can 
obviously cause changes in tortfeasors’ calculations of the costs and 
benefits of their actions, resulting in downstream consequences for 
individuals who might have been victims in the future (and for those who 
may face higher costs or lower benefits as a result of the tortfeasor 
internalizing the harm that can lead to liability). The regulatory space also 
includes entry regulation of pharmaceutical products. Obviously, tort law 
depends not only on the substantive nature of the claim, but on the 
incentives for lawyers to represent clients with potential tort cases—and 
in particular, the rules governing how lawyers may use class actions and 
other means to aggregate claims. 
1. Tort Law: Preliminary Observations 
The complaint in Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. 
Amerisourcebergen Drug Corp. illustrates some of the legal arguments 
advanced in the context of multi-district litigation (MDL) targeting opioid 
manufacturers.125 
First, the plaintiffs made the case that the manufacturers engaged in 
false, deceptive, and unfair marketing of opioids. The manufacturers spent 
an alleged $14 million on medical journal advertising of opioids in 2011, 
for example, which is nearly triple of what they spent in 2001.126 
Advertisements focused on the benefits of opioids for chronic pain. They 
also promoted the use of opioids through sales representatives, spending 
“in excess of $168 million in 2014 alone on detailing branded opioids to 
doctors, more than twice of what they spent in 2000.”127 
The complaint also contends that industry leaders have used indirect 
marketing strategies. The manufacturers indirectly marketed their opioids 
using “unbranded advertising, paid speakers and ‘key opinion leaders’ 
(‘KOLs’), and industry-funded organizations.”128 One key opinion leader 
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was heavily funded by the manufacturers and created the Opioid Risk 
Tool, a five-question, one-minute screening tool relying on patient self-
reports which purportedly allowed doctors to predict the risk that their 
patients will become addicted to or misuse opioids, but was in fact 
inaccurate in many cases.129 Another notable case is presented by the 
American Pain Foundation (APF), which billed itself as the independent 
voice of pain patients while it advocated for increased opioid prescribing. 
APF issued education guides, engaged in a significant multimedia 
campaign to educate patients about their “right” to pain medications, and 
launched a campaign to promote opioids for veterans.130 When an 
investigation by ProPublica revealed that nearly ninety percent of APF’s 
budget came from opioid manufacturers and that its board included many 
individuals with extensive financial ties with the industry, APF’s credibility 
was destroyed and it closed its doors soon afterwards.131 
The manufacturers’ marketing scheme misrepresented the risks and 
benefits of opioids. Janssen, for example, reviewed, edited, approved, and 
distributed a patient education guide entitled Finding Relief: Pain 
Management for Older Adults (2009), which described as “myth” the claim 
that opioids are addictive, and asserted as fact that “[m]any studies show 
that opioids are rarely addictive when used properly for the management 
of chronic pain.”132 As another example, Endo distributed a pamphlet 
entitled Living with Someone with Chronic Pain, which stated that “[m]ost 
healthcare providers who treat people with pain agree that most people do 
not develop an addiction problem.”133 These claims are contrary to 
longstanding scientific evidence.134 A peer-reviewed, systematic analysis 
of studies of patients prescribed opioids for chronic back pain 
concluded that “up to one quarter of patients who are receiving these 
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medications exhibit aberrant medication-taking behaviors that may be 
interpreted as signs of abuse.”135 
Second, the lawsuits also emphasize how manufacturers and 
distributors unlawfully distributed opioids. The manufacturers and 
distributors have a duty under federal and state law to guard against and 
report unlawful diversion and to report and prevent suspicious orders. 
The sheer volume of prescription opioids distributed to pharmacies was 
excessive for the community’s medical need and facially suspicious. In a 
2017 agreement between McKesson and the DEA, McKesson admitted that, 
at various times between 2009 and 2017, it did not identify or report to 
the DEA certain orders that should have been detected as suspicious.136 
McKesson was fined $150 million.137 
Purdue Pharma and a variety of other companies conducted their 
business through legitimate and illegitimate means in the form of an 
association-in-fact enterprise and/or a legal entity enterprise (the “Opioid 
Diversion Enterprise”). Finding it impossible to legally achieve their sales 
goals, the Opioid Diversion Enterprise systematically and fraudulently 
violated their statutory duty to maintain effective controls against 
diversion of the drugs, to design and operate a system to identify 
suspicious orders, and to notify the DEA of suspicious orders.138 The illegal 
scheme was allegedly hatched by an association-in-fact enterprise 
between the manufacturers and the distributors. The scheme enabled the 
companies to extract billions of dollars in revenue. Underscoring the 
connection between regulatory strategies and the tort system, the 
plaintiffs hope to use the DEA’s Automation of Reports and Consolidated 
Orders Systems (ARCOS) to build cases that distributors knowingly 
shipped millions of pills to outlets where there was an unreasonable risk 
of diversion to addicts.139 
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Third, plaintiffs and commentators argue that opioid manufacturers 
and distributors created a public nuisance by lulling prescribing 
physicians into believing drugs like OxyContin were safe and non-
addictive. One article draws parallels to the lead paint litigation in 
California, where cities argued that paint manufacturers created a “public 
nuisance” by selling lead paint despite knowing that lead is dangerous.140 
With respect to discerning the defendants’ legal theory of the case, few 
of the cases against the pharmaceutical companies appear to have 
advanced to motions for summary judgment. As expected, some 
defendants have argued that a number of the plaintiffs’ arguments are 
preempted by federal law and Food and Drug Administration 
regulations.141 On the public nuisance claims, defendants will argue that 
opioids were distributed through tightly regulated channels and were 
prescribed by physicians.142 
As far as the adequacy of the pleadings, at least one court has 
dismissed a number of claims against the manufacturers and distributors 
in a case brought by the City of Chicago. In the Northern District of Illinois, 
the court dismissed the City’s claims alleging unfair practices, false 
statements, civil conspiracy, false claims, insurance fraud, recovery of city 
costs, and unjust enrichment, but upheld its claims for deceptive 
practices.143 
Civil liability has spillover effects in related domains. The MDL cases 
have triggered legal and policy responses that are difficult to envision 
occurring if litigation had not been commenced. One of the major 
developments since the creation of the MDL has been an agreement by the 
federal government to release data. After previously releasing data for 
manufacturers only for 2012 and 2013, the DEA recently agreed to provide 
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percent of opioids in every state from 2006 through 2014.144 The DEA had 
previously voiced objections to a broad disclosure of records.145 The data 
comes from ARCOS, which receives roughly 80 million reports annually 
from drug companies about transactions involving controlled 
substances.146 Information will include a state-by-state breakdown and 
will show the “aggregate amount of pills sold and the market shares of 
each manufacturer and distributor.”147 The DEA has stated it would be 
willing to apply this opioid sales data to other legal challengers.148 
There are at least two-dozen counties, cities, and towns pursuing 
lawsuits in state court.149 There has also been some recent action bringing 
lawsuits against pharmacy benefit managers (third-party administrators 
of prescription drug programs for health plans), including Express Scripts, 
CVSHealth, and OptumRx.150 
2. Tort Law and Civil Litigation: Prospects for a Global Settlement 
and Comparisons to Tobacco Litigation 
The opioid-related multidistrict litigation has also sparked discussions 
about whether a global settlement could resolve all opioid-related 
litigation, as occurred with tobacco. One challenge would be figuring out 
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how to spread cash evenly across the country, including to local, state, and 
federal entities.151 Some of the plaintiff municipalities are represented by 
plaintiffs’ lawyers under contingency-fee contracts.152 Plaintiffs’ lawyers 
might be more interested in reaching a financial settlement, whereas 
states might be more interested in injunctive relief, such as reforms in the 
ways drugs are distributed and more robust systems for preventing 
diversion.153 Amanda Pustilnik points out that unless any settlement 
imposes enduring incentives on the industry to reduce the incidence of 
opioid addiction, the likely effect will be that a large check is written and 
then the industry continues on largely as before. Pending state court 
litigation—which continues outside of the MDL—also makes it difficult to 
provide closure in order to reach global peace.154 
Judge Polster seems interested in hammering out a global settlement 
between parties. He stated at a January hearing that he would like a global 
settlement that would “do something meaningful to abate this crisis and do 
it in 2018.”155 The Justice Department has asked to be allowed to 
participate in settlement talks—not as a party, but as an amicus with the 
opportunity to provide information on the opioid crisis and how any 
potential settlement could be crafted to combat the growing number of 
overdoses.156 
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The landmark tobacco litigation that played out over decades serves as 
an interesting case with which to compare and contrast. For most of the 
twentieth century, the tobacco industry reigned supreme in the 
marketplace, in the culture, and in politics. No industry returned more per 
dollar invested over the twentieth century than tobacco; few convinced so 
much of the public to romanticize their product; and generations of state 
and federal officials learned to their pain that crossing the industry was 
usually fruitless at best, perilous at worst.157 The tobacco industry fought 
tooth and nail to maintain this situation because, unlike the 
pharmaceutical industry, it had only one product. The industry therefore 
regarded any effort to limit the sale or document the harms of tobacco as 
an existential threat, justifying any tactic and any resource investment. Yet 
the situation changed in the last third of the century, with the industry 
becoming loathed by the public, seeing its political capital dwindle, and its 
profits and practices crimped by laws and lawsuits.158 
How did this change happen, and could something similar happen with 
opioid manufacturers? At least three factors merit analysis. First, scholars 
and other researchers pursued major research efforts yielding an 
enormous body of evidence to rebut the cigarette manufacturers’ claims. 
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Cigarettes were advertised as healthy and indeed physician-recommended 
for most of the twentieth century; a 1946 advertising campaign claimed 
(on slim evidence) that Camels were the favorite cigarette of American 
doctors.159 For decades after the 1964 U.S. Surgeon’s General report 
announcing to the country that cigarette smoking was harmful to health, 
the tobacco industry’s spokespeople continued to maintain—even under 
oath at congressional hearings—that cigarettes were not addictive.160 
Such assertions and others raising related arguments about the 
relative safety of “light” and “low-tar” cigarettes were undermined by 
decades of careful scientific work conducted by legions of researchers 
around the world.161 The findings of these researchers did not languish in 
obscure journals but were disseminated by advocacy groups and used by 
lawyers in court.162 
Second, lawsuits, legislative hearings, and whistleblowers revealed the 
extent to which the industry had engaged in destructive conduct. A 
plausible defense against false claims for the industry was that no one 
knew the risks of smoking. Nonetheless, the release of the Tobacco Papers 
showed that the industry had indeed long known of the risks and 
suppressed the evidence.163 They had also conducted extensive research 
on how to make cigarettes more addictive, how to market to children and 
other vulnerable groups, and how to defeat safety measures and 
regulatory checks. These revelations put the industry in an indefensible 
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position in court cases. They also destroyed its once-positive image with 
the public. Wayne McLaren, the iconic Marlboro Man, appearing in anti-
smoking ads after he was diagnosed with lung cancer, epitomized the 
irony at the heart of the tobacco industry’s efforts to shape public 
perceptions over the decades.164 
Third, generational turnover took its toll on the industry, particularly 
as younger generations were exposed to different norms and practices 
reflecting changes in public health-policy motivated restrictions on 
smoking. The exposure of the tobacco industry’s conduct certainly 
changed some minds among those who were alive at the time, but broader 
changes in attitudes driven by generational turnover also played a part. 
Americans became more health conscious, which aided some industries 
(e.g., health clubs, organic food stores) and hurt others (e.g., tobacco).165 
Also, the country came to contain many millions of people who had buried 
grandparents, parents, uncles, and aunts they had lost to smoking-related 
illnesses.166 This created a constituency that was responsive rather than 
resistant when, for example, legislators imposed high taxes on tobacco and 
greater restrictions on tobacco advertising. 
All three of these factors are present in the example of opioids, and 
indeed the third should come into play even more quickly because opioid 
addiction typically does visible harm to the user much faster than does 
cigarette addiction. Nonetheless, two factors differentiate the cases in 
ways that may make it more difficult to impose public health-oriented 
laws on the opioid industry. 
First, whereas there is no safe, healthful way to consume a cigarette, 
opioids are essential medicines that when prescribed judiciously can 
dramatically relieve human suffering. The explosion of prescribing thus 
helped at least some patients and continues to do so, even though it also 
caused widespread addiction and death. This situation spurs the 
involvement of multiple regulators in the policy debate––with potentially 
competing priorities in terms of facilitating pain treatment relative to 
limiting misuse—and dilutes the influence of any one decision maker. The 
possible benefits of opioids may also create a more ambiguous situation 
than obtained with respect to tobacco, ambiguities that could cause 
hesitation in the mind of a disinterested judge, juror, or legislator, and 
could be exploited in argument by an advocate of the industry. 
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Second, because cigarettes existed prior to federal consumer 
protection laws such as the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act, they were never 
reviewed and sanctioned for sale in advance by the federal government. In 
contrast, every pharmaceutical opioid on the market was approved by the 
Food and Drug Administration. Opioid manufacturers thus may adopt a 
particular line of defense against lawsuit: How can the government blame 
us for manufacturing and selling a substance that the government itself 
verified as safe and effective? In contrast, this is not a line of reasoning that 
could be used by distribution companies that knowingly shipped huge 
numbers of opioids to addiction hotspots and failed to intervene in or even 
report such deliveries. The conduct of these distribution companies was 
not approved in advance by the federal government and indeed violates 
the spirit and probably the letter of relevant federal law. 
Decades after the legal and political landscape changed for the 
industry, tobacco still kills over 450,000 Americans a year and seven 
million worldwide. Even as the tobacco industry has been forced to live 
with new domestic regulatory constraints, the industry has reacted to 
tightened regulation in developed countries by expanding activities in 
developing nations, much as the opioid industry has begun to do.167 Thus 
even if a similar revolution in regulation occurred for prescription opioids 
as has for tobacco, the best scenario is a lessened death toll rather than an 
eliminated one. 
Both the tobacco and opioid cases underscore how substantive and 
procedural content of law plainly matters, but how that substantive law is 
implemented, enforced, and adapted to changing circumstances also 
matters. By turning our attention to those issues, we begin to see a more 
complicated picture, where policy goals must be translated into specific 
criminal and regulatory enforcement strategies, and where tort law and its 
implementation must strike a balance between addressing a sprawling 
array of potentially valid claims and administrative feasibility. 
3. Challenges and Constraints Affecting Civil Litigation in the 
Opioid Context 
Tort law is premised on the prospect that individuals and 
organizations anticipating liability will have reason to alter their 
behavior—for example, by internalizing the costs associated with a 
product or activity that society would bear alone absent the imposition of 
tort liability on the entity. At least some of the arguments advocates 
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advanced in the tobacco context underscored this premise. And indeed, 
some commentators suggest that present and prospective opioid-related 
litigation has begun to affect the behavior of pharmaceutical companies 
and other market participants. Litigation may contribute to the reduced 
prescribing of opioids and self-imposed marketing limitations by the 
major manufacturers.168 Distributors may become increasingly concerned 
about their potential liability due to their role in exacerbating opioid 
abuse.169 
Nonetheless, civil litigation often faces a host of constraints as a means 
of addressing public health challenges.170 Some of these challenges bedevil 
complex tort suits across a variety of substantive domains, including 
familiar and sometimes understandable limitations on class action 
certification, arbitration clauses, and contending claims from experts that 
are difficult to disentangle. Tort suits involving pharmaceutical products 
pose even further challenges. 
One complexity in the opioid context is the highly regulated nature of 
the drug industry. Unlike cigarettes at the time of the tobacco litigation, for 
instance, opioids are regulated by the FDA.171 Judges and juries may defer 
to the agency’s approval of the opioid products as safe and effective for 
treating pain and the drugs’ warning labels that disclose addiction-related 
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risks.172 As a general matter, an entity’s compliance with federal laws or 
regulation provides a complete defense to liability, where federal law is 
held to preempt state law. In other settings, compliance with federal law is 
merely admissible but not conclusive (since at common law, compliance 
with the law does not provide a defense to negligence).173 Some states 
have explicitly made evidence of compliance admissible, and at least one 
state—Oregon—has gone further by eliminating punitive damages where 
prescription drugs comply with FDA regulations.174 
In the many civil liability settings where regulatory compliance is 
considered at least admissible, compliance is most relevant in cases 
proceeding under the somewhat novel theory of design defect.175 In one 
such case, the court held that, under such a theory that the drug was not 
effective for any class of patients, plaintiffs had a heavy burden to prove 
“an articulable basis for disregarding the FDA’s determination that the 
drug should be available.”176 By contrast, in another case where the 
defective design theory turned on “whether an ordinarily prudent 
manufacturer, being fully aware of the risks, would have placed the 
product on the market,” the court, in upholding a verdict for plaintiffs, 
discussed the basis for disregarding the FDA’s finding of efficacy.177 
Early suits alleging design defects or failure to warn generally 
foundered on defenses of FDA approval, despite the possibility that 
arguably adequate warnings to prescribers may not have been conveyed 
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to patients.178 In fact, holding drug makers responsible was difficult on any 
viable theory of liability where “the prescriber’s decisions and the patient’s 
behavior contributed to the harm” or where “[s]ome individuals [did] not 
take opioids as prescribed or purchase them illegally.”179 These early suits 
also faced difficulties in obtaining class certification, thus avoiding 
defenses based on individual conduct, but with changing social attitudes it 
may be easier to establish the necessary elements, as in the case of the 
Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome classes.180 Although claims of public 
nuisance and lax monitoring brought by state and local governments may 
avoid the problems of unsympathetic plaintiffs and challenges of the 
earlier strategies, claims of deceptive business practices may be difficult to 
prove without whistleblower evidence such as was available in the 
tobacco litigation.181 Plaintiffs have attempted to fill that void with 
information that has emerged in prior settlements, government 
investigations, investigative reporting, and continuing marketing 
practices.182 Unjust enrichment claims may be hard to make out where 
courts insist on a showing that the state or municipality conferred a direct 
benefit on the company, but public insurance payments contributing to 
company profits may help make out the claim.183 
What’s more, the range of defendants targeted in the more recent 
litigation may threaten to confuse the chain of causation and undermine 
plaintiffs’ ability to hold anyone responsible. Criminal distributors are 
plausible intervening actors in claims against both manufacturers and 
distributors.184 As the use of interrogatories in tobacco and some opioid 
litigation suggests, defendants may also try to argue that no one 
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distributor is aware of what other distributors are doing and that plaintiffs 
cannot show that any particular distributor’s product was diverted into 
the black market.185 The multiplicity of defendants highlights a crucial 
difference from the tobacco litigation—there are many more links in the 
chain in the case of opioids as compared with tobacco companies where 
the same company would produce, distribute, and market the product.186 
In addition, although plaintiffs in the federal MDL have so far managed 
to survive preemption claims, the pharmaceutical manufacturers seem 
likely to continue to assert them and, whatever success they have in trial 
courts, may continue to press these arguments before appellate courts. 
A final complexity may arise from parallel civil and criminal 
proceedings, which can complicate tort actions and civil regulatory 
enforcement. Such situations arise not infrequently in white collar 
criminal enforcement, such as in investigations of suspected violations of 
securities law. Such proceedings raise a variety of concerns, particularly in 
relation to the use of materials obtained through discovery in one 
proceeding and used in connection with the other. Civil defendants, for 
instance, may be able to bolster their criminal case against the government 
through civil discovery, while the government’s use of civil discovery 
materials in criminal proceedings may raise self-incrimination issues 
under the Fifth Amendment. No formal or pervasively-followed informal 
rules structure precisely how courts should proceed. In the past, the lack 
of agreement sometimes led to courts attempting to issue injunctions 
against other courts.187 In recent years, some courts have resolved 
potential problems by staying proceedings, usually the civil proceedings, 
on the motion of the parties.188 Where courts perceive a stay motion to be 
excessively strategic, especially on the part of the government, they may 
deny the motion.189 
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F. Cases Against Purdue Pharma and Drug Distributors: Examples of 
Criminal and Regulatory Enforcement, Legal Remedies, and 
Constraints 
The treatment of Purdue Pharma and drug distributors offers an 
illustration of both the delayed nature of enforcement in the opioid context 
as well as the interplay of procedural and substantive constraints affecting 
criminal and civil liability. If these developments showcase how criminal 
enforcement and civil liability have been a slow-moving, uncertain process 
in this context, they also underscore the interplay between litigation and 
public awareness, particularly given how litigation can result in the release 
of information concerning the economic context and organizational 
choices affecting the opioid crisis or spur legislative investigations. 
Because of the relatively slow nature of much of the civil litigation and 
criminal enforcement response in this domain, the dilution of the more 
conventional regulatory response given resistance to legislative and 
regulatory action has almost certainly had even more pronounced 
consequences. 
1. Purdue Pharma 
In the late 1990s, Purdue Pharma argued that OxyContin, because of 
its time-release formulation, posed a lower threat of misuse and addiction 
to patients than traditional painkillers like Percocet or Vicodin.190 Purdue 
Pharma heavily promoted OxyContin, particularly to primary care doctors, 
who typically have little training in the treatment of serious pain or in 
recognizing signs of addiction in patients.191 The extraordinary amount of 
money spent promoting OxyContin was unprecedented: during its first six 
years on the market, Purdue spent approximately six-to-twelve times 
more on promoting it than did the two other competing manufacturers on 
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their sustained-release opioids.192 By 2001, OxyContin was the most 
frequently prescribed brand-name opioid in the United States for treating 
moderate-to-severe pain.193 
In 2007, Purdue Pharma paid $600 million in fines and other 
payments to resolve criminal and civil charges related to the 
“misbranding” of the narcotic painkiller OxyContin.194 Three current and 
former executives of Purdue Pharma also pleaded guilty to criminal 
charges that they misled regulators, doctors, and patients about the drug’s 
risk of addiction and its potential to be abused.195 Their pleas covered 
conduct from late 1995, when OxyContin received FDA approval, to mid-
2001, when Purdue Pharma dropped its initial marketing claims for the 
drug.196 The executives agreed to pay a total of $34.5 million in fines.197 If 
the executives had trafficked $3,000 worth of heroin, they would have 
faced a mandatory five-year federal prison sentence, but their role in 
generating an estimated $30 billion in revenue from OxyContin did not 
result in them spending even a single day behind bars. 
After the 2007 fine, Purdue funded some diversion prevention 
programs, such as those to prevent pharmacy robberies or to prevent 
other family members from stealing relatives’ pills.198 The company 
eventually rolled out a tamper-resistant version of the painkiller that was 
somewhat harder to crush and snort, but Purdue apparently failed to 
address the problem of the drug wearing off early.199 An investigation by 
the Los Angeles Times found that Purdue representatives had discovered 
that doctors were prescribing more frequent doses of OxyContin; these 
concerns came in tension with the heavy emphasis on sales and lucrative 
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bonuses available to pharmaceutical sales representatives who could 
convince doctors to write prescriptions for higher dosage strength.200 
These practices garnered attention from potential plaintiffs and their 
lawyers. Following the 2007 enforcement action, plaintiffs filed a number 
of separate lawsuits against Purdue Pharma (and its owners, the Sackler 
family) and other pharmaceutical companies alleging that the companies 
spent millions on marketing that trivialized the risks of opioids, and 
lobbied doctors to influence their opinions.201 These lawsuits include, 
among others, actions by attorneys general in Ohio, Illinois, and 
Mississippi; actions by four counties in New York; and actions by Santa 
Clara and Orange Counties in California.202 
The Massachusetts Attorney General, for example, has alleged that 
Purdue Pharma retained McKinsey & Co., which advised the company how 
to increase sales, how to counter drug enforcement efforts to reduce 
opioid use, and how to counter emotional messages from mothers with 
teenagers that overdosed on the drug.203 The complaint details further 
efforts to ward off criticism as more attention focused on opioid abuse. 
According to the complaint, the Sacklers and Purdue attempted to push the 
media narrative that misuse, not addiction, was the cause of the terrible 
consequences of opioid profusion; that people who misused opioids, 
rather than the producers, were the problem—they were “junkies” and 
“criminals.”204 When those tactics failed, the Sacklers tried to portray 
themselves as not actively involved in Purdue’s operations and 
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203. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 182. As to the last, the 
Massachusetts complaint alleges that Craig Landau, the Chief Medical Officer 
and then CEO, developed a strategy to position extended-release and long-
acting opioids as safer than immediate release opioids; and to identify pain 
patients to imply the extended-release technology was more effective even 
though he knew that it was no more effective and that abuse of oxycodone 
was worse than comparable pain medications. Id. ¶¶ 799-802. Landau also 
oversaw a marketing campaign for a purportedly abuse-deterrent 
formulation he knew would have no such effect and that was in fact expected 
to have a “balloon effect” on the market for Purdue’s products. Id. ¶¶ 806-07. 
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management, despite employee trepidation about such boldfaced lies.205 
The Sacklers also sought to expand their business and improve their image 
by purchasing a company that treated opioid addiction.206 
Although some of the aforementioned enforcement actions and recent 
lawsuits appear to have had an impact, litigation against the 
pharmaceutical company has also faced a variety of constraints arising 
from the nature of the procedures and substantive provisions at issue. 
Purdue has attempted to ward off suits by indicating that they may seek 
bankruptcy protection and subsequently made a settlement offer which 
the plaintiffs are debating internally as of this writing. It is hardly 
surprising that a company in Purdue’s position may be eager to settle if 
they can do so reasonably. The Massachusetts complaint further alleges 
that Craig Landau ascended to the CEO position by pitching a strategy of 
managing the company’s loss of R&D capacity and loss of credibility with 
the FDA by doubling down on its focus on opioids and attempting to 
dominate that market as other participants fled in the face of bad 
publicity.207 In recent public statements, Landau has indicated that the 
company may seek bankruptcy protection, “depend[ing] on what unfolds 
in the weeks and months ahead,” apparently referencing pending trials.208 
In earlier litigation, plaintiffs have had difficulties establishing a causal 
connection between pharmaceutical company practices and injuries to 
plaintiff states or municipalities. In Koenig v. Purdue Pharma Co., 435 F. 
Supp. 2d 551 (N.D. Tex. 2006), for example, the court held that the plaintiff 
had not established that his addiction and adverse health consequences 
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were causally related to Purdue’s and its partners’ marketing practices. 
Purdue has also regularly been able to defeat class certification.209 
Purdue Pharma has also sometimes been able to avail itself of defenses 
involving individual plaintiffs’ wrongful conduct—a defense neutralized in 
lawsuits from states and cities. Where plaintiffs crushed oxycontin pills 
and eliminated the time-release function, for example, and where plaintiffs 
procured pills through illegal means, some courts have found plaintiffs 
were barred from recovery.210 Where plaintiffs have attempted to allege 
design-defect claims based on the ease of bypassing the time-release 
mechanism by crushing pills, Purdue has been able to raise a misuse or 
alteration defense.211 And similarly, where plaintiffs have brought failure 
to warn claims, courts have found that inserts indicating that crushing 
OxyContin could yield a deadly dose and that it could be addictive and a 
target for drug abusers and addicts were sufficient to insulate Purdue, 
under comment k to Restatement; (Second) of Torts, § 402A, from strict 
liability because the product was unavoidably unsafe.212 The probability 
that Kentucky would adopt the learned intermediary rule was also held to 
insulate Purdue in that case.213 In cases bringing implied warranty of 
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merchantability claims, Purdue has sometimes been able to successfully 
argue that the statute of limitations had run.214 
In many of the cases brought by state attorneys general, Purdue has 
also managed to settle for comparatively small amounts.215 In other cases, 
litigation over removal to federal court (whether based on the Grable 
standard or CAFA) and consolidation in an MDL has dragged on for 
years.216 
2. Drug Distributors 
The main civil claim brought against distributors has been that they 
negligently, knowingly, and recklessly continued to distribute drugs to 
third parties, despite their knowledge that the drugs would be used for 
diversion rather than legitimate medical needs.217 The claim includes 
allegations that the distributors failed to satisfy their obligations under the 
Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) and its implementing regulations to 
monitor and report suspicious opioid orders.218 In particular, the claim 
alleges that distributors failed to investigate suspicious orders, document 
the result of the investigation, and halt the sale if not reasonably satisfied it 
was for legitimate sale by the retail end user.219 The specific causes of 
action in the Massachusetts cases, for instance, include public nuisance, 
common-law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligence, violation of 
General Laws c. 93A, § 11 (unfair business practices), unjust enrichment, 
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and civil conspiracy.220 New York State’s recent supplemented complaint 
also alleges violations of a state finance law. 
Based on the claims brought against the distributors, it is possible that 
the Department of Justice’s large settlement with McKesson for CSA 
violations in early 2017, coupled with the D.C. Circuit’s ruling a few 
months later on the force of amended reporting regulations, alerted state 
and local plaintiffs to the possibility of using regulatory compliance as a 
basis for pursuing, negligence actions.221 The D.C. Circuit’s ruling was an 
indication that there was firm legal ground for claims against the 
distributors. The DOJ settlement was a reminder that McKesson and other 
distributors have very deep pockets and the resources to satisfy 
settlements or judgments after Purdue, or other manufacturers whose 
revenue was more closely tied to opioids, are depleted of resources.222 
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indicated that it may seek bankruptcy protection. 
The details of how multi-district litigation is managed can play an 
important role. The drug companies and distributors were uniformly 
unsuccessful in removing and consolidating with the MDL the actions 
brought by Massachusetts towns.223 The crucial point was that 
Massachusetts law does not allow proof of per se negligence but only 
considers a statutory violation as evidence going to negligence, and so 
alleged violations of the Controlled Substances Act and implementing 
regulations did not provide a basis for federal court jurisdiction over state-
law causes of action.224 Ultimately, the Massachusetts municipality 
plaintiffs were able to keep their claims in state court, but they will 
possibly bear a heavier burden of proof in establishing negligence. 
Defendants have also attempted to get cases removed under CAFA.225 
Another possibility is that plaintiffs are concerned about statute of 
limitations issues. Plaintiffs have argued that the distributors are equitably 
estopped from asserting statute of limitations and laches defenses because 
they undertook efforts to purposefully conceal their unlawful conduct.226 
Some of the cases against the distributors depend on showing that the 
distributors should have known better in light of the information they had 
when they were intensely involved in distributing opioids. The New York 
Attorney General’s complaint, referenced below, presents extensive 
evidence to this effect, but also indicates that gathering that evidence must 
have been quite difficult, as suggested by the volume and detail of the 
evidence and the redactions in the New York complaint. The redactions, in 
particular, suggest the resource-intensive nature of law enforcement 
activity necessary to gather this information. Only in 2019 did a federal 
prosecutor—in this case, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern 
District of New York—bring a federal civil action against the Rochester 
Drug Co-operative (“RDC”) for failure to comply with its legal duty to 
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report suspicious orders of controlled substances to the DEA.227 The 
complaint alleges, among other charges, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 842(a)(5) 
and 21 C.F.R. § 1301.74(b) and likewise points to the CSA’s implementing 
regulations as a basis for the action.228 
Meanwhile, in congressional hearings in the spring of 2019, most of 
the executives of the distribution companies sought to disclaim any 
responsibility for the opioid epidemic.229 The executive chairman of 
Cardinal Health, by contrast, attempted to simultaneously take and 
downplay responsibility, suggesting that its role simply amounted to 
imprudent involvement with two West Virginia pharmacies.230 Cardinal 
Health sent 10.5 million pills to one pharmacy over an eight-year 
period,231 and, along with McKesson, sent 12.3 million doses to another 
pharmacy over the same period.232 
In addition, in Masters Pharmaceutical, a distributor facing the 
prospect of losing its certification to distribute controlled substances 
sought to argue that the decision that Masters failed to comply with the 
suspicious orders management system imposed by settlement effectively 
amended existing DEA rules in violation of the APA.233 More specifically, 
Masters argued that where a rule is established through notice and 
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comment, it cannot be amended in an adjudication, and the DEA’s decision 
revoking its certification amounted to amending two such rules.234 
3. The Role of Criminal Cases and Civil Litigation in Addressing 
Misuse of Licit Drugs: Preliminary Observations 
It seems quite plausible that criminal cases and civil lawsuits are 
playing some part in addressing the opioid crisis, particularly by 
contributing to settlements that sometimes meaningfully change 
marketing practices; spurring public attention; providing for the release of 
documents showing how the epidemic unfolded; and, to some extent, 
exposing key individuals to the prospect of liability they would prefer to 
avoid. Yet these criminal and civil actions have also coexisted with 
relatively diluted regulatory governance: civil litigation and white-collar 
criminal cases are often slow and somewhat uncertain even when key 
stakeholders clamor for a vigorous response to a crisis. In this context, 
both civil and criminal responses are to some extent dependent on the 
regulatory mechanisms like prescription monitoring that have been 
routinely constrained by interest group pressures. On the criminal side, 
the investigations and prosecutions were initially slow to get started. 
Moreover, the conduct targeted is understandably subject to many 
defenses, particularly because opioids have some legitimate uses. As a 
result, unlike the penal provisions that apply to substances such as heroin 
or cocaine, the penal provisions relevant to opioids do not use the mere 
fact of possession or intent to distribute as a basis for concluding that the 
defendant is engaged in socially damaging conduct that deserves a severe 
punishment. On the civil side, the remedies are far more ex post relative to 
measures directly seeking to regulate distribution. In addition, the 
contingencies of civil litigation, including aspects such as class certification 
and allegedly contributory conduct from those affected by opioids, 
complicate recovery. Thus, criminal and civil liability, however delayed or 
contingent, appear to have begun to shape the policy narrative in ways 
that may contribute to less diluted regulatory governance over time. 
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IV. DILUTED REGULATORY GOVERNANCE: OPIOIDS AND THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF PUBLIC HEALTH REGULATION 
Compare the publicly conveyed level of concern among policymakers 
and civil society organizations with the various challenges and limitations 
associated with the use of the different available legal tools—from 
prescription monitoring to prosecutions to class actions—to address 
opioid abuse. The juxtaposition is jarring: virtually every legal mechanism 
is difficult to use in practice and, in many cases, delayed in effect for years. 
In addition, these mechanisms are often replete with limitations that have 
either persisted despite broad public concern, or, in some cases, have been 
deliberately developed because of political, economic, or bureaucratic 
agendas, to limit the success and extent of enforcement and civil remedies. 
To resolve the puzzle of why nominal government control of a product 
failed to stem stark increases in use and harm, and why it took so long for 
public concern about opioid-related damage to public health and safety to 
translate into legal action and policy change, we must remember the 
constraints and competing agendas at work in a pluralist system that 
disperses power over the policymaking, enforcement, and regulatory tools 
we have described. Even for tobacco, which, unlike opioids, has no licit 
medical use, no one actor controls the various enforcement, regulatory, 
legislative, and litigation-related decisions that plausibly shape public 
health outcomes of this kind.235 Although coalitions of policymakers, 
lawyers, and civic leaders can alter the landscape, sophisticated actors 
with concentrated economic benefits can hold important sway in shaping 
the policy agenda.236 Enforcement of existing criminal and regulatory laws 
can be complicated given a rickety existing infrastructure that collects 
relevant data. And while civil litigation can contribute to spurring broader 
action, tort liability takes time and lawyers face a variety of hurdles in 
advancing their arguments for liability arising from a regulated product. 
At a minimum, for years after it became clear there was a public health 
problem with a serious regulatory dimension, the story associated with 
regulatory and criminal enforcement showcases what might be called 
“diluted regulatory governance.” Public officials face a version of this 
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challenge when addressing a variety of public health problems, but this 
problem is even more likely to arise with addictive drugs that can be 
destructive but are also beneficial under some circumstances. 237 Diluted 
governance involves limited gathering of information from key actors in 
the system relative to what is feasible under both existing law and 
plausible reforms; relatively rare referrals for prosecution from regulators 
or state authorities (and likely limited action where these do occur); and, 
more generally, less complementary criminal-regulatory enforcement. 
Such complementary enforcement epitomizes efforts to target money 
laundering since the 1980s, where criminal statutes are used to heighten 
regulatory compliance, including vigorous implementation of suspicious 
activity reporting requirements and due diligence. And regulatory 
compliance (by generating the information on which criminal cases are 
partially based) tends to increase the possibility of successful criminal 
prosecutions. A closer look reveals both the extent to which competing 
agendas shape the legal response to the opioid crisis, and also some of the 
key factors likely to affect the consequences of any effort to address public 
health through the enforcement of legal provisions or the application of 
civil remedies.238 
Consider first some of the background political realities affecting 
legislative or regulatory responses that we have described in the 
preceding sections. Regulating the flow of a drug that can be legally 
prescribed but routinely misused depends to some extent on the existence 
of broad public concern, but such relatively disaggregated concern may 
prove meager in comparison to the highly concentrated interests of drug 
companies and pharmacies who could be severely affected by policy 
changes in this area. Meanwhile, society has fragmented the responsibility 
for opioid policy and enforcement across state and federal entities, across 
health and criminal justice policymakers, and across multiple agencies.239 
Across a range of situations, doctors and patients had (and, in many cases, 
retain) incentives favoring distribution of opioids.240 
Nor did legislators or agencies routinely find that substantial, 
meaningful policy changes were easy to achieve or especially valuable 
politically in the early days of the crisis. Although individual legislators 
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may have increasingly felt their constituents growing concerned about the 
situation, the pressure to enact administrative, criminal, or enforcement 
changes was lessened by their range of opportunities to take relatively 
symbolic positions or to merely support research and treatment. 
Enforcement agencies sometimes lacked the means to obtain the full range 
of relevant information useful in developing (civil or criminal) cases. As in 
a variety of domains involving risk and public health, ranging from vehicle 
safety to tobacco, tort law played a crucial role as a backstop capable of 
generating information, public attention, and, eventually, credible risks of 
penalties and negative publicity that could reshape the incentives of large 
private organizations. Yet while tort lawsuits were possible and eventually 
commenced, the lawyers and parties here too encountered familiar 
challenges involving the aggregation of claims, the complexity of causation 
questions in this context, and the difficulty of prevailing where the 
government has explicitly approved a product. 
Of course, constraints on regulatory policy and enforcement are 
familiar in many contexts involving public health, environmental 
protection, and other domains where the benefits are disaggregated and 
the costs are concentrated.241 The financial regulatory reform effort begun 
in 2009, for example, culminated in legislation including diluted provisions 
to manage systemic risks and stark constraints on the regulatory powers it 
granted to protect consumers.242 This outcome was certainly made more 
likely given de jure and de facto legislative veto points triggered by 
powerful legislators, and subsequent administrative impediments 
affecting the speed and substance of regulatory rules.243 The regulation of 
firearms provides yet another fertile example of conflict over regulatory 
policy.244 
What is important to recognize in the opioid context is that these 
limitations not only arise, but can be enormously consequential, despite 
stark changes in health risks and substantial public concern, and despite a 
variety of settings where public health policymakers leverage their 
relative insulation and protection rooted in public law to achieve 
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significant innovations.245 That such headwinds can frustrate even a 
subject capable of generating serious concern among the public and 
policymakers is an important conclusion we want to emphasize. Although 
such public concern has certainly had an effect on discrete policy issues, it 
suggests that legal responses to public health problems cannot depend 
entirely and perhaps not even primarily on an engaged public. Where 
collective action problems exist given the vast numbers of affected parties 
and the difficulty of coordinating meaningful action, change must depend 
more at the margin on savvy regulatory entrepreneurs within government, 
such as the FDA officials who led efforts to expand tobacco regulation; 
partially insulated agency or adjudicatory entities, such as the FTC; and 
philanthropic efforts to address policy failures that may persist despite 
public concern, such as funding collaborations currently underway to 
promote new research, public education, and policy changes involving 
climate change. 
Meanwhile, policy responses affecting the legal mechanisms available 
to deal with prescription opioid addiction have almost certainly been 
affected by the industry’s efforts to bolster its reputation. Campaign 
contributions to state legislators by the pharmaceutical industry outpace 
those of groups trying to fight opioid overprescribing by 220 to 1.246 Less 
direct forms of influence and stature have been sought through 
philanthropy. The Sackler Family, for example, which owns Purdue 
Pharma and has made billions from OxyContin, has donated money to New 
York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art, London’s Victoria and Albert Museum, 
the Louvre, and the Smithsonian, among many other cultural landmarks. 
247 They have also made high-profile donations to prominent 
universities.248 Unlike families such as the Fords, Packards, and Johnsons, 
their name does not grace their main product—OxyContin—but the 
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Sacklers have been assiduous in ensuring that their name is prominently 
displayed in association with any donation they make.249 
Nor can we assume that all public health regulatory issues are created 
equal or that the conditions affecting them remain static over time. We 
earlier discussed changes in the legal arrangements and social policies 
affecting tobacco consumption in the United States. Major public health 
changes have also occurred in food safety, occupational and environmental 
health, and nutrition. We note that changes in these domains often depend 
on some mix of long-term strategy by public officials, support from civil 
society and philanthropy, and changing public attitudes. We find few if any 
examples of far-reaching, successful, public health-related legal or policy 
change occurring within less than a decade. Nor can we conclude that all 
drug-related policy problems generate the same response. As discussed 
earlier, the extent of the law enforcement response targeting illicit drug 
use in the 1980s and 1990s affected even the most far-flung parts of the 
federal law enforcement apparatus and fundamentally reshaped key 
aspects of state criminal law. 
The starkest contrast is in the federal criminal justice system, which 
took over an unprecedented prosecution and incarceration role for drug 
crimes in the 1980s and 1990s, increasing the number of federal inmates 
about sixfold.250 Yet as the opioid epidemic rages on, Congress in 
December 2018 enacted the First Step Act, which reduces federal prison 
incarceration, including by paving the way for early release of thousands 
of individuals convicted on drug charges.251 This retreat of federal law 
enforcement regarding the opioid epidemic creates some policy space for 
expansion of public health approaches such as were embodied in the 
SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act passed in October of 2018. At 
the same time, as emphasized above, both of these federal changes were 
many years in the making and were of constrained scope when they finally 
arrived. 
None of these observations suggests that it is impossible to adjust 
American society’s legal and policy responses to the opioid crisis. Some 
progress is possible, and indeed, the last few years reflect a growing 
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awareness among policymakers that existing legal tools were inadequate 
to address the situation. The SUPPORT Act of 2018 as well as the 
Comprehensive Addiction Recovery Act and the 21st Century Cures Act of 
2016 provided federal funding for expanded access to opioid addiction 
treatment and to the opioid overdose rescue drug naloxone, and also 
provided significant research funds regarding opioid addiction as well as 
development of alternatives to opioids for pain.252 Even more significantly, 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 defined substance 
use disorder treatment as an essential health care benefit to be provided at 
parity with other health benefits in Medicaid and in private insurance 
plans sold on state exchanges.253 This policy change substantially increases 
Americans’ access to opioid addiction treatment, although whether that 
will be sustained is unknown given judicial, legislative, and executive 
efforts to roll back the Affordable Care Act. 
Other policy changes remain within reach despite the more modest 
progress achieved in regulatory policy as well as criminal and regulatory 
enforcement. Although these responses are not guaranteed to have an 
impact in isolation, they are likely to contribute to further progress in 
combination. They become more feasible after substantial public concern 
persists for years, and litigation against some large companies begins to 
gain traction and to produce further information. Federal and state 
officials, for example, can continue experimenting with new means for 
monitoring prescriptions and establishing appropriate regulatory 
oversight for companies involved in drug distribution. Policymakers can 
also safeguard autonomy, promote appropriate coordination, and 
providing adequate resources for federal and state regulatory and criminal 
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justice agencies addressing the problem. They can enhance the use of task 
forces and other mechanisms for coordination, particularly where a legal 
product that can be abused is at issue. They can provide access to 
documents helping legislatures, the media, and the public understand the 
nature of decision-making by private entities in this area and the 
consequences. They can teach effective use of appropriate databases and 
monitoring tools to inform public decisions about seeking redress through 
civil actions or accountability through the criminal justice process. 
Learning from the experience with opioids and other products with 
addictive properties can also spur improvements in the analysis of costs 
and benefits undertaken by regulatory agencies, including the FDA. Where 
not prohibited by statute, such analyses can consider the likely difficulties 
in achieving effective enforcement and regulation arising from 
concentrated interests with a considerable stake in the continued, more 
lightly-regulated distribution of potentially hazardous products. It is hard 
to see how regulatory impact analyses are likely to give a particularly 
useful description of the world if they fail to consider the institutional 
realities we’ve described in this article, including organized resistance to 
compliance, possible changes in public norms, and the interaction of civil 
and criminal enforcement. Although it may be analytically difficult to 
incorporate these factors, public officials and stakeholders can use a 
variety of techniques to make progress, including simulations, scenario 
planning, and historical analyses. 
Of course, jurisdictions can also invest in making treatment more 
affordable and training law enforcement officials to manage opioid-related 
emergencies.254 Public agencies and private distributors such as 
pharmacies can improve distribution channels for naloxone.255 State 
governments can enhance regulatory data collection to monitor opioid 
flows and take corrective action through civil and criminal enforcement, 
and the federal government can improve its capacity to track opioid use, 
addiction, and overdose trends.256 Perhaps doctors, researchers, and the 
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organizations within which they work can develop alternative approaches 
for dealing with pain through a mix of public funding and support from 
other sources.257 But because some key actors have strong reasons to 
protect their economic and legal interests, the extent of constraints we 
have described here affect not only the production of legislative or 
regulatory responses, but also the implementation of them. That is reason 
for caution—though certainly not for a sense of futility—about the success 
of any legal or policy change in this area. 
CONCLUSION 
Powerful political and economic actors can frustrate the normal 
translation of widespread societal concern into broad changes in law, 
policy, and enforcement. A variety of governance arrangements are often 
capable of responding to public concern as a means of forestalling 
backlash or more dramatic changes in the future. Yet in a pluralist system 
of institutions with distinct powers, private actors’ opposition can stultify 
changes in enforcement, in the implementation of existing authority, or in 
policy reform despite widespread public alarm. Some of this disconnection 
may be socially valuable because initial impulses to make changes in 
regulation or criminal enforcement may not be the right ones (e.g., a brutal 
war on drugs policy). In addition, sometimes there is moral panic about a 
putative problem that proves evanescent, such as a new drug that emerges 
in a few cities, causes some deaths that receive wide media coverage, and 
falls out of favor with users almost immediately and stops being a 
problem. 
But there is also a cost. In the opioid context, concern rose well before 
the various pressures shaping the legal system began to trigger meaningful 
responses—including regulatory and criminal enforcement. Well after 
policymakers and the public became aware of the extent of the problem, 
American institutions remained constrained by the mix of risk aversion, 
organized legal and political resistance from stakeholders, and limited 
resources that resulted in diluted regulatory governance. The resulting 
picture is not without nuances, reflecting some federal, state, and local 
efforts to move aggressively against opioid abuse even in the early years of 
the crisis. But for the most part, entities ranging from state legislatures to 
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the Justice Department and the DEA often stopped short of using all the 
tools at their disposal to enhance regulatory policies and pursue 
enforcement targeting opioid abuse. Civil tort lawsuits faced the 
considerable difficulties that often bedevil aggregate litigation. 
As the years since the start of the opioid crisis passed, certain aspects 
of this picture began to change. The Justice Department began to show 
more interest in both criminal and regulatory enforcement. It sought 
changes from Congress to facilitate an expanded DEA role in monitoring 
and investigation. State attorneys general and local jurisdictions relied on 
tort law to serve as a crucial backstop for a rickety and slow-to-change 
regulatory system, generating considerable attention even if it came long 
after opioid-related morbidity and mortality had spiked. As lawsuits and 
settlements began to advance, in some cases these proceedings resulted in 
the release to the public of industry documents describing company 
strategies to market opioids despite addiction risks. That the response 
nonetheless has been slow despite the extent of public concern 
underscores the difficulty of enforcement-oriented policy change involving 
legally available drugs that are addictive. These difficulties matter because 
in domains involving parties willingly transacting with each other, the 
actual imposition of criminal liability often depends heavily on regulatory 
mechanisms to detect offenses. This is true even if illicit activity generates 
sufficiently widespread societal concern to justify broad criminal 
enforcement. These mechanisms allow agencies to gather information, 
impose prophylactic rules, and levy more serious sanctions (more serious 
than just routine fines for noncompliance), using criminal liability as a 
backstop. But in this context, the development and use of regulatory 
capacity was at times neglected by policymakers and in some cases 
frustrated by opposition from industry players and their hired help. 
Balancing that dynamic takes agencies with politically sophisticated 
leadership prioritizing enforcement, litigants capable of leveraging a civil 
litigation, and emerging changes in the widespread public salience of the 
opioid crisis. These factors have taken a considerable amount of time to 
develop in this context, leaving many missed opportunities to align 
regulatory and criminal enforcement realities with asserted public health 
priorities. 
The opioid crisis also raises the question of whether, as a general 
matter, our understanding and implementation of regulation in the United 
States is adequate when addictive products are at issue. All addictive 
products, including opioids, pose a challenge to Adam Smith’s “invisible 
hand” thesis, which holds that the pursuit of rational self-interest guides 
efficient, socially beneficial markets. Because addictive products can 
induce maladaptive changes in brain circuits affecting learning, 
motivation, and decision-making, they can lead to people consuming drugs 
that destroy their lives rather than advance their self-interest. For this 
reason, addictive products are not “ordinary commodities.” The 
intertemporal utility conflicts and negative externalities support a 
compelling case for tight regulation.258 For tobacco products, the relevant 
political economy arising from business incentives and societal norms 
once cut decisively against substantial regulation. Recent conditions tend 
to be far more supportive of regulation, at least in developed countries. 
But in contrast to nominally legal opioids, tobacco is in some sense an 
easy case in that using it as directed, by definition, harms health and 
indeed has a high chance of causing premature mortality.259 More akin to 
opioids are addictive products such as alcohol and electronic slot 
machines, which for any given user can have a benefit particularly if not 
used for extended periods; one can safely enjoy a glass of wine with 
dinner, or risk small amounts of money on slots during a once-a-year trip 
to Vegas. Even more importantly, opioids are required for the 
management of certain serious medical conditions. Coupled with an 
awareness in some quarters of the costs associated with criminal and 
regulatory enforcement, these public impressions understandably 
heighten resistance to regulating them more strictly even though the net 
social welfare benefit of doing so is likely to be positive. 
The resulting mix of pressures and institutional constraints is likely to 
affect any societal effort to implement sensible legal arrangements 
addressing these health-related challenges, from access to tort-law 
remedies to monitoring regulations to appropriately enforced criminal 
sanctions. In a market economy with pluralist political institutions, a 
critical problem is that the very addictiveness of these products makes 
them lucrative to produce and sell. When any such product is legalized, a 
powerful actor is created with significant resources available to achieve a 
measure of regulatory capture and to exploit the constraints associated 
with existing criminal enforcement and imposition of civil liability. For 
these reasons, even as policymakers, lawyers, and scholars consider 
options to recalibrate policy responses to public health crises involving 
addictive products, they should be realistic about the constraints 
governments face and the resistance they are likely to encounter. 
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If jurisdictions learn to take better advantage of the unusual recent 
extent of public concern, it will save tens of thousands of lives per year and 
mark one of the first successful forays into regulating addictive products 
that bring benefit to some but misery or death to others. Yet without 
overcoming the serious constraints that have delayed and, in some cases, 
diluted society’s response to the opioid crisis, narrow interventions 
focused on a single area of law or isolated technical changes in treatment 
will almost certainly fail to address the larger problem. That is reason for 
caution—though certainly not for a sense of futility—about the prospects 
for success of any legal or policy change in this area. 
